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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
Tolerance Uncovered:  
How Frequency of News Exposure and Contact Affects Tolerance of Groups 
 
 
by  
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Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Political Science 
University of California, Riverside, December 2019 
 Dr. Jennifer Merolla, Chairperson 
 
 
Tolerance of opposing viewpoints is a critical aspect of a functioning democracy.  Past 
research on tolerance has made substantial progress in recent years, but we are left 
without a comprehensive understanding of the extent to which more frequent exposure to 
positively or negatively framed coverage affects tolerance of out-groups, and to what 
extent these effects may be enhanced or moderated by different types of contact with a 
member of said out-group. Using a mixed methods approach that relies on both 
quantitative (laboratory experiments) and qualitative (interviews and content analysis) 
methods my dissertation research contributes to our understanding of the of effects of 
media and contact on tolerance of groups.  Using Muslim-Americans as a case study, I 
begin with detailed content analysis of 40 news articles related to the 2010 controversy 
over a proposed Mosque in Temecula, CA.  I find the overwhelming majority of these 
articles framed the proposed Mosque construction in a negative way.  Fear of extremist 
activity, Islam as a domestic threat, and Islamization of America were common themes.  I 
vi 
 
follow my content analysis with interviews of Temecula residents who were either for or 
against mosque construction.  Among the opposition, I find similar themes to my content 
analysis related to fear of Islam and Muslims. The majority of supporters argued that 
media played an important role in creating opposition to the proposed Mosque.  My 
qualitative work provides context for three original experiments that I use to argue and 
demonstrate that positive media exposure leads to significant increases in tolerance, and 
that these effects increase with multiple positive media exposure.  I also show that 
exposure to multiple negative news stories leads to reductions in tolerance greater than a 
single story alone.  I further demonstrate that contact is an effective means of increasing 
tolerant judgements.  I first use self-reported measures of contact to illustrate the effects of 
contact alone and its interaction with different types (positive or negative) and amounts 
(frequency) of media.  I find that high levels of contact moderate the effects of negative 
media, including exposure to multiple negative frames.  I also find that contact enhances 
the effects of positive media exposure.  To better develop the causal relationship between 
contact and tolerance, I then devise and conduct a novel original experiment where 
contact is randomly assigned in the context of exposure to two negative or a single 
positive news article.    I find that contact alone leads to significant increases in tolerance 
and that these effects are enhanced by positive media and washed out by negative media.  
Together, my dissertation demonstrates that the formation of tolerant judgments is a 
multi-factorial process, the interactions of these factors are important, and each factor (i.e. 
media, contact, and frequency) should be considered to operate on a continuum. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
At a December 2015 rally in Charleston, South Carolina, just a few days after the San 
Bernardino, California shootings, presidential candidate Donald Trump announced to 
thousands of supporters “Donald J. Trump is calling for a complete and total shutdown of 
Muslims entering the United States until our county’s representatives can figure out what 
the hell is going on” (Healy et al. NYTimes, 2015). In his 2016 election campaign, Trump 
was by far the best “earner” of free media coverage. Trump estimated $2 billion in 
“earned media” over the first nine months of his campaign (Healy et al. NYTimes, 2015). 
He was prolific with statements in the media that negatively framed immigrants and 
minorities.  
 This pervasive negative rhetoric among politicians and political pundits raises 
many important questions. I utilize Muslim Americans as a case study to understand one 
of the most salient: How does the media play a role in influencing tolerance of minority 
groups? Specifically, I investigate the effects of both positively and negatively framed 
coverage on tolerance, and whether these effects may be moderated by contact with 
Muslim Americans.  Media frames and the effects of contact are well studied, however 
the effects of frequency (i.e. exposure to multiple news stories) and it’s interaction with 
contact represent a significant gap in the existing literature.  I argue that as individuals 
are exposed to an increasing number of negatively framed news articles, tolerance 
towards Muslims decreases, and as individuals are exposed to an increasing number of 
positively framed articles, tolerance increases. Further, I argue that contact also plays a 
significant role in influencing tolerant judgments. Specifically, contact on its own has a 
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significant effect and this effect interacts with the type and amount of media exposure. 
Using a mixed methods approach, I demonstrate media frames, frequency, and contact 
all play important roles in shifting tolerant judgments.  
Defining Tolerance?  
In my research I employ the definition of tolerance developed by Bernard Crick 
(1973).  Tolerance implies willingness and ability to put up with opinions and/or 
behaviors that one opposes or rejects (Sullivan et al. 1981). It is important to think of a 
tolerant individual as someone who reflects a specific style of cognitive operation (Sullivan 
et al. 1981). When we say that one tolerates an individual, we certainly do not mean that 
one likes or approves of them, but merely that, in spite of their dislike, and opposition, 
one shall endure them and/or their action (Allport, 1979). Marcus et al. (1995, 3) states, 
“political tolerance requires that democratic citizens and leaders secure the full political 
rights of expression and political participation of groups they find objectionable.” 
Tolerating someone implies the willingness to permit the expression of other people’s 
ideas or interests. Tolerant individuals do not restrict ideas that challenge their own 
opinions. To tolerate something or someone is a negative act of acceptance and 
endurance. Specifically, political tolerance is when one allows those with whom they 
disagree the freedom to practice their constitutional rights in the promotion of their views 
(Marie Ann Eisenstein argues, 2008). 
  In this dissertation, I examine tolerance towards members of an outgroup. I 
further distinguish between democratic norms and tolerant beliefs. One may hold 
democratic values while simultaneously expressing intolerance by failing to apply those 
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values. Importantly, intolerance is not disagreement in attitudes and/or opinions, but 
rather actions resulting from those disagreements.  Marie Ann Eisenstein argues “political 
tolerance is about actions, not attitudes” (15, 2008).  For example, arguments against a 
woman’s right to an abortion are not necessarily intolerant provided no action is taken.  
 The concept of tolerance has been frequently confused with notions of 
democracy, freedom from prejudice, and open-mindedness. It is often construed that 
individuals who are without prejudice are tolerant and that those who hold prejudiced 
beliefs are intolerant. The two notions do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. A prejudiced 
individual may be tolerant “if he understands his prejudices and proceeds to permit the 
expression of those things toward which he is prejudiced” (Sullivan, Marcus, and Pierson 
1979: 4). Conversely, a tolerant individual does not necessarily imply an absence of 
prejudiced beliefs (Sullivan et al. 1981). 
Why Study Tolerance?  
 Tolerance is a fundamental principle of democracy that requires opposing views 
to be represented (Prothro and Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964). Tolerant beliefs include, 
but are not limited to, the willingness to permit expression of ideas and/or interests that 
one opposes.  Political tolerance is crucial and any deviation in society from promoting 
tolerance is undesirable and threatens the very existence of democracy (Prothro-Grigg 
1960, McClosky 1964; Lawrence 1976, Davis 1975). 
A key factor distinguishing democracies from alternative forms of government is 
the degree to which opposition is permitted. Although democratic regimes both allow and 
encourage opposition, they sometimes face the challenge of balancing between opposing 
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viewpoints and tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1989).  Citizens within 
democracies should not restrict the participation of their fellow citizens in the political 
system, even if their ideas challenge the view of the majority (Gibson 2010). 
 The importance of tolerance is apparent when divisions arise.  In democracies, 
conflicting parties must have the right to engage in politics within the bounds of what is 
legal and civil (Sullivan et al. 1982).  When the public makes decisions, opposing 
individual(s) must have the right to engage in politics and continue legal opposition 
without the fear of reprisal, even if unpopular opinions are expressed. Tolerance within a 
democratic system helps to keep the opposition within the limits of legitimate political 
procedures, and ensures access to participation is available to all citizens. Tolerance is 
essential because it protects citizens’ rights to political opposition and expression, thereby 
protecting them from the danger that members of a majority may violate the rights of the 
minority.  
 Tolerance also encourages the autonomy of the individual, which is a central 
aspect of democratic governance. Individual autonomy is the capacity to be one's own 
person, and to live a life according to reasons and motives that are one's own and not the 
product of distorting and manipulative external forces (Mill, 1956). This is critical to the 
development of human capacities. Tolerance aids in the fulfillment of individual 
autonomy because it allows expression, as long as no harm is done to others. It does so by 
encouraging the creation of a society that encourages political and religious 
heterogeneity.  
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The concept of tolerance has a long history in theory and philosophy, particularly 
as it relates to social life of religious practices (Marie Ann Eisenstein, 2008,16). In 
sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, many philosophers wrote on religious 
toleration.  In “A Letter Concerning Toleration” John Locke argued that the political 
authority should not interfere with an individual’s religious belief. Locke argued that 
governmental authority and individual autonomy were two-distinct spheres of knowledge 
and action, and that religious belief is a private matter. For Locke, allowing individuals to 
decide their own religious beliefs is a principal means of protecting government 
legitimacy. He emphasized that if government tries to enforce religious homogeneity 
through violence or the use of force, this in turn would “negate the justification for 
government and replace legitimate government with illegitimate government” (Marie 
Ann Eisenstein, 17, 2008).   
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison emphasized their lifelong commitment to 
tolerance in their proclamation for separation of church and state, which we today 
attribute modern interpretations of First Amendment religious clauses and twenty-first-
century notions of appropriate church-state relations. In “A Memorial and 
Remonstrance,” Madison argued his most important contribution to the notion of 
church-state separation. This petition was written in opposition to the proposed Virginia 
bill establishing a provision for a “Teacher of the Christian Religion”. This petition was 
an important factor in the ultimate defeat of the proposed bill and enactment of 
Jefferson’s bill establishing religious freedom. (Timothy Hall, 1997). 
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Many theorists have argued that considerable tolerance of unpopular opinion is 
required for a functioning democracy. Thomas Jefferson argued that tolerance is valued 
in a democracy because it recognizes equal rights for all citizens. Jefferson believed a free 
market of ideas is the best means to discover “truth” (Notes on the State of Virginia, 
1944).  Tolerance allows individuals to express a wide variety of ideas and beliefs, even if 
the majority disagrees.  In a democracy, it is expected that differences are resolved 
through a fair process, in which people are treated as equals. In turn, tolerance promotes 
individual and social goods that are linked to the pursuit of equality. An absence or 
reduction in tolerance creates a risk of minority suppression, or in the extreme, a situation 
where the majority tyrannizes the minority.  Madison similarly argued that the 
constitutional order dividing government into “distinct and separate departments” 
(Federalist 51) protects against oppression. Specifically, he argued that ordinary politics 
moderate mass sentiments of intolerance as long as targets of intolerance are diverse, and 
in turn the federal constitutional order protects civil liberties of all.  
Although Americans overwhelmingly express democratic principles of respecting 
and ensuring the rights of unpopular political minorities, in practice this turns out to be 
far more difficult, and in many cases, not necessarily the outcome. The U.S generally 
does not have laws prohibiting ostensible religious symbols such as the headscarf in 
France.  However, social forms of intolerance are emerging and increasing in the U.S. 
For example, in May 2010 an announcement was made for a proposed Islamic cultural 
center and mosque near ground zero (known as Park 51). This event sparked national 
media attention in which politicians and commentators worked themselves and viewers 
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into a frenzy. Republicans intensified efforts to stop the construction of the center calling 
it a threat to American values (Altman, TIME, Aug 2010). Some argued that the mosque 
might be funded by radicals (McManus, LA Times, Aug, 2010), Newt Gingrich weighed 
in by stating: “there should be no mosque near Ground Zero in New York so long as 
there are no churches or synagogues in Saudi Arabia…It is simply grotesque to erect a 
mosque at the site of the most visible and powerful symbol of the horrible consequences 
of radial Islamist ideology” (Hertzberg, New Yorker, Aug 2010). Democrats did not shy 
from objecting to construction of the Center. For example, Senator Harry Reid said 
through a spokesman, that those who plan to erect the Islamic center should look 
elsewhere. The high-profile coverage of Park 51 fueled a surge in hate crimes against 
Muslim individuals, mosques, and Muslim-owned business around the country 
(Abdelkader, 2016).  Anti-Muslim protests surged, including opposition to new Islamic 
centers from California to Georgia (McGreal, The Guardian, Aug 2010).  Construction 
of this Islamic Center and Mosque reflects one of the many salient and controversial 
incidents in the last decade, in which a clear fundamental democratic principle has been 
placed in question.   
Factors that Influence Tolerance 
Among the most important of many factors that influence tolerance judgments 
was first identified by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) in their work developing a 
theory of pluralistic intolerance. The authors argued that if and when a society lacks 
consensus on who the enemy is, widespread intolerance may decrease and neutralize. 
Specifically, if society picks a variety of “least-liked” groups, it is difficult to mobilize 
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against these groups because there is insufficient agreement regarding who to dislike. 
Other important works identified predictors of intolerance as well. Sniderman (1975) 
looked at both self-esteem and social learning as factors. Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 
(1982) argue that threat perceptions, democratic values, and psychological insecurities 
each play a role. Stenner (2005) examined the effects of authoritarian personality traits. 
These studies have a common theme that “closed-mindedness’ or psychological rigidity 
contribute to intolerance, even if the precise label attached to the concept varies across 
researchers. 
 Threat, and/or the perception of threat is another important factor contributing 
to intolerance. Individuals who are or feel threatened are less likely to be tolerant of those 
whom they are threatened by (Gibson and Gouws 2003; Davis and Silver, 2004; Marcus 
et al. 1995; Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2009).  Scholars agree 
that higher threat perceptions lead to a greater likelihood that tolerance will decrease. For 
example, Merolla and Zechmeister (2009) find that some individuals react to terrorist 
threats by expressing increased distrust of others in society and are more likely to express 
intolerant and punitive attitudes.  
While there is extensive literature looking at the factors that influence tolerant 
judgments, few studies have looked at the role of the media in influencing tolerance 
towards Muslim Americans. My research explores the effects of both positively and 
negatively framed media on tolerance of Muslims.  In this dissertation, I argue and 
demonstrate that exposure to negative media coverage of Muslim salient issues causes 
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tolerance towards Muslims to decrease.  Conversely, I argue and demonstrate that 
positive media coverage increases tolerance towards Muslims.  
Media and Framing Matter 
There is considerable scholarship and widespread agreement that the media plays a 
significant role in affecting public opinion by framing issues in distinct ways (Gamson et 
al. 1992, Iyengar 1991, Zaller, 1992; Nelson and Kinder 1996, Nelson et al., 1997; 
Druckman, 2001, Chong and Druckman, 2007; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). My 
research supports this idea and further details how media affects tolerance of groups.  
Framing refers to “subtle alterations in the statement or presentation of judgment and 
choice problems” (Iyengar, 1991, p.11).  Research on framing consistently argues that 
characterization of issues in the media has a profound influence on how these issues are 
understood by viewers (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1984; 
Kahneman, 2003, Goffman 1974). Through text and other presentations, media frames 
can define social and political issues and situations, set the terms of a debates (Reese, 
Oscar, Grant 2001), declare underlying causes and likely consequences of a problem, and 
establish criteria for evaluating potential remedies (Iyengar, 1991).  
Frames include both visual and verbal material, which may have significant 
consequences on viewers perceptions and understanding of an issue, and in turn directs 
formation of individual opinions about a controversy (Iyengar 1991, Nelson and Kinder 
1996). Specifically, frames may shape individual opinion by stressing a specific element or 
feature of a broader controversy (Neslon, Oxley, and Clawson, 1997). For example, 
Sniderman and Theriault (2004) find that individuals overwhelmingly support increased 
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government spending on social programs for the poor when the issue is framed as 
improving economic outcomes. Conversely, when the same programs are framed as 
resulting in higher taxes, individuals tend to oppose increased spending.  
One prominent study that connects tolerance and media is Nelson, Clawson and 
Oxley (1997) study of framing effects. The authors conduct an experiment examining 
effects of news frames on tolerance of the Ku Klux Klan. Participants were presented 
with one of two local news stories about a Klan rally. One story framed the rally as a 
disruption to public order.  The second framed the rally as a free speech issue. 
Participants who were exposed to the free speech frame were more tolerant of the Klan 
than participants who were exposed to the public order frame. The authors conclude that 
media framing affects tolerance of groups. Specifically, they argue that frames affect 
opinions simply by making certain considerations and values seem more important than 
others, which in turn carry greater weight in developing the final attitude. 
While there is some literature testing whether or not media frames affect tolerance 
(Nelson, Clawson and Oxley, 1997; Nelson & Oxley, 1999; Ramírez et al. 2011), we are 
still not clear to what extent frequency of exposure to the media affects tolerance, and 
whether or not interactions with individuals targeted by the coverage may mitigate the effects of 
news exposure. Therefore, my project asks the following questions:  
1. To what extent does exposure to positive (single story exposure) and negative 
(single story exposure) news stories lead to respective increases or decreases in 
tolerance?    
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2. To what extent does more frequent exposure to positive or negative news stories 
lead to respective increases or decreases in tolerance? 
3. Does contact with a member of an out-group increase or decrease tolerant 
attitudes in the absence and availability of positively and negatively framed 
media?  
Why Study Muslim Americans As a Case?  
To best understand the effects of repeated media exposure on tolerance, I selected 
a minority group that has been consistently covered in the media but has not been 
considered extensively in scholarship: Muslim Americans. Stories involving Muslims in 
the media have been frequent. For example, Figure 1.1 from the Pew Research Center 
illustrates four of the top five religion stories in 2010 involved controversies related to 
Islam. The plan to build an Islamic center and mosque near ground zero was the top 
religion story in 2010. The third story involved a Florida pastor’s plan to host a Koran 
burning event on September 11th.  The fourth most covered religion story “dealt with 
public perceptions of the president’s faith and the belief among a large segment of the 
public that Obama is a Muslim” (Pew, Feb, 2011).  
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Importantly, coverage on Islam and Muslims has been both frequent and consistently 
framed negatively (Figure 1.2).  The Pew Research center conducted a review of news 
media to determine the number of stories that express anti-Muslim sentiments.  They 
found 24% of cable news airtime studied expressed anti-Muslim sentiments between 
September 6-12, 2010.  The proportion was similarly high for broadcast news (21%), 
online (12%), radio (12%), and newspaper (8%). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1.  Pew Research Data demonstrates four of the top five religion 
stories in 2010 involved controversies related to Muslims and/or Islam. 
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Figure 1.2. Anti-Muslim Sentiment, Percent of Newswhole by Media Sector. 
 
It is well-established that minorities have been consistently underrepresented, 
negatively represented, or completely erased from US media (Behm-Morawitz & Ortiz, 
2013; Tukachinsky, Mastro, & Yarchi, 2015).  In particular, media portrayals of Muslims, 
Arabs, and people from the Middle East has been especially negative (e.g., Lajevardi and 
Oskooi, 2019; Colligwood, Lajevardi, and Oskooii; 2018; AlSultany, 2012; Dill et al., 
2005; Dixon & Williams, 2015; Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2007; Powell, 2011; Shaheen, 
2009). This has been especially the case since September 11, 2001 (Bridge Initiative 
Team, George Town University).  Muslims and Islam have been framed as ‘terrorist’, 
‘violent’, ‘extremists’, ‘fundamentalist’, ‘aggressors’, ‘radicals’, and ‘fanatics’ (Mishra, 
2007b; Trevino et al., 2010; Ibrahim, 2010; Kumar, 2010; Martin and Phenlan, 2002; 
(Saleem et al. 2017; AlSultany, 2012; Dill et al., 2005; Dixon & Williams, 2015; Nacos & 
Torres-Reyna, 2007; Powell, 2011; Shaheen, 2009; Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & 
Vermeulen, 2009; Kalkan, Layman, & Uslaner, 2009; Nisbet et al., 2009; Saleem & 
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Anderson, 2013). This type of negative reporting is found across several media outlets 
including cable news (Dixon & Williams, 2015), newspapers (Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 
2007; Powell, 2011), television and movies (Alsultany, 2012; Shaheen, 2009), web 
animations and flash-based games (Van Buren, 2006), and traditional video games (Dill, 
Gentile, Richter, & Dill, 2005).  
 Scholarship on the effects of media frames on tolerance of Muslims, while not 
extensively studied, is generally in agreement with works on other groups.  Ogan et al. 
(2013) analysis demonstrated that U.S respondents who were more attentive to media 
coverage of Park 51 were less likely to support building of the Islamic Center in New 
York City. These individuals were also more likely to have negative views of Islam and 
Muslims.  Some examples of these views include: Islam is a religion of violence and 
Muslims should not have the same rights as other religious groups.  The increase of 
negative opinions towards Muslims has been partly driven by security threat perceptions 
in the media (Ciftci, 2012; Wike and Grim, 2010). In many cases, individuals themselves 
recognize, at least implicitly, the strong influence of media on the formation of their 
opinions and views.  The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Survey (2007) found that 
respondents reported the media as the most influencing factor towards forming opinions 
of Muslims (Figure 1.3).  Importantly, studies detailing effects of repeated exposure to 
both positively and negatively framed media on tolerance of Muslims is limited, and 
existing work has not considered how this intersects with interpersonal interactions with 
Muslims.    
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In this dissertation, I examine the effects of media exposure and contact on tolerance of 
groups using Muslim Americans as a case study. I argue and demonstrate that when 
individuals are exposed to a single negative news story tolerance is decreased. Conversely, 
when individuals are exposed to a single positive news story tolerance increases. I also 
demonstrate that frequency of exposure has additional effects. I will show that the effects 
of single exposure are enhanced when respondents are exposed to multiple news stories. 
Furthermore, I argue that contact plays a significant role in influencing tolerant 
judgments. Specifically, contact on its own increases tolerance. I also argue and 
demonstrate that contact has a moderating effect in the context of negative news media 
and enhancing effect in the context of positive media.  
Figure 1.3: Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Survey, Aug, 2007 
Earlier you said that you had a very/mostly favorable/unfavorable opinion of Muslims. 
Which of the following has had the biggest influence on your view of Muslims? A personal 
experience, the views of your family and friends, what you have seen or read in the media, 
your religious beliefs, your education, something else [ Q.48F2 ] 
4% Don't know/Refused  
11% Something else  
18% Your education  
11% Your religious beliefs  
32% What you have seen or 
read in the media  
6% The views of your family 
and friends  
18% A personal experience 
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The Rest of the Dissertation  
 The following chapters will examine the effects of media exposure to either 
negative or positive news stories on tolerance.  Importantly, I also test the effects of 
repeated exposure to both positively and negatively framed media.  In addition, I assess 
the effects of contact in isolation and its interaction with media exposure.  In chapter 2, I 
develop my core theoretical arguments and hypotheses through an in-depth literature 
review.  Chapter 3 details the qualitative dimension of my research, which further 
develops the ideas I test experimentally in chapters 4 and 5.  My qualitative work first 
includes a detailed content analysis of over 40 articles related to construction of a Mosque 
in the City of Temecula in 2010.  I find fear of Islamic extremism and increased traffic 
are the two most commonly cited reasons Mosque construction is opposed.  I later use 
this finding to develop my experiment treatment articles.  A second important aspect of 
my qualitative work employs phone interviews of Temecula residents who either 
supported or opposed construction of the Temecula Islamic Center.  Importantly, all 
members of the interview cohort lived in Temecula concurrent with the controversial 
debate on construction of the Islamic Center. Qualitative analysis of my interviews 
provides initial support of my hypotheses that both media and contact are important 
factors influencing tolerance. Overall, chapter 3 enhances our understanding of what 
contributes to tolerance judgments.  
In chapter 4, I employ quantitative methods to answer the following questions: 1) 
To what extent does exposure to negative frames in media coverage lead to decreases in 
tolerance, and 2) To what extent does exposure to positive frames in media coverage lead 
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to increases in tolerance. Chapter 4 utilizes data from three experiments I conducted on 
both student (experiments I and III) and national population (experiment II) samples 
using Qualtrics and Amazon Mechanical Turk. My three experiments complement each 
other to present a strong case demonstrating how media exposure matters in affecting 
tolerance judgments. Specifically, I first show that exposure to a single, positively framed 
article causes significant increases in tolerance, which is particularly striking given an 
environment that overwhelmingly covers Muslims negatively.  Second, I demonstrate that 
exposure frequency is a critical element in understanding the effects of both positive and 
negatively framed media.   
 Chapter 5 focuses on the effects of contact on tolerance.  Specifically, I assess the effects 
of contact in isolation and its interaction with single and repeated exposure to both 
positive and negative media.  Chapter 5 employs data from experiments II and III.  
Importantly, experiment II utilizes a national sample and provides treatments to assess 
the interaction of contact with both single and repeated exposure.  Experiment II 
employs self-reported measures of contact using an approach common in the literature.  
Experiment III utilizes a unique design in which contact is randomly assigned using 
female assistants with and without the very recognizable Islamic headscarf (hijab).  
Experiment III was specifically designed to manage problems associated with self-
reported measures of contact, and improves my ability to draw causal inferences.  I 
demonstrate that contact is an important factor in affecting tolerant judgements.  I further 
show that contact can both mitigate the effects of negative media and enhance the effects 
of positive media exposure.  Chapter 6 concludes my work by providing a summary of 
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findings and includes suggestions for future work to further develop our understanding of 
the effects of media and group contact on tolerance. 
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Chapter 2: The Theoretical Perspective: How Media Exposure Affects Tolerance of 
Groups 
 
“No one is disputing that America stands for, and should stand for, religious 
tolerance. It is a foundation of our republic. This is not an issue of religious 
tolerance but of common moral sense. To build a mosque at Ground Zero is a stab 
in the heart of the families of the innocent victims of those horrific attacks.”– Sarah 
Palin (McManus, LA Times) 
 
The words of former Governor of Alaska, Sarah Palin illustrate a common 
narrative that emerged during the planned construction of an Islamic Center and 
Mosque in New York City.  
In May 2010, an announcement was made for a proposed Islamic cultural center and 
mosque near ground zero (known as Park 51).  This event sparked national media 
attention that manifested in protests and attacks on existing and proposed mosque sites all 
across the country. Park 51 reflects one of the many salient and controversial incidents in 
the last decade, in which the media have presented Muslims and Islam through an “un-
American or even anti-American” lens (Nacos and Torres-Reyna. 2011).  While the 
headlines on the Park 51 mosque have dissipated, the effects of its overwhelmingly 
negative coverage are still reverberating today. Over the last few decades, scholars have 
consistently demonstrated overwhelmingly negative coverage of Muslims and Islam 
(Korteseg, 2008; Mishra, 2007a; Shaheen, 2009; Bowe etal., 2013; Ibrahim, 2010; 
Colligwood, Lajevardi, and Oskooii; 2018; AlSultany, 2012; Dill et al., 2005; Dixon & 
Williams, 2015; Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2007; Powell, 2011) and an overall increase in 
anti-Muslim sentiment across the country (Saad, 2006; Ciftci, 2012; Strabac and 
Listhaug, 2008; Lajevardi and Abrajano, 2019; Lajevardi and Oskooii; 2018). My 
research seeks to better understand the connections between media coverage and these 
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sentiments.  I employ Muslims as a case study to better understand the effects of both 
positive and negative media on tolerance of groups, and to what extent contact can 
increase tolerance in the presence and absence of media.  
In the previous chapter, I presented my main argument that the media plays a 
role in affecting tolerance of groups and that contact with individuals plays a role in 
mitigating the effect of news exposure on tolerance. This chapter will fully specify the 
mechanisms by which these processes occur. I argue and demonstrate in the chapters that 
follow, exposure to a positive news story involving a Muslim salient issue leads to 
increases in tolerance towards Muslims, while exposure to a negative news story involving 
a Muslim salient issue leads to decreases in tolerance of Muslims. Furthermore, I argue 
and demonstrate that frequency of exposure to positive and negative news stories also 
plays a role in shifting public opinion of Muslims. In essence, as individuals are exposed to 
multiple negatively framed news articles, tolerance will correspondingly decrease and as 
individuals are exposed to multiple positively framed articles tolerance will increase. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates a graphical depiction of my theory. This chapter will expand upon 
and elaborate the mechanisms of my theory.  I begin by specifying the ways in which 
media exposure may influence and change public opinion. Next, I examine how and why 
negatively framed media leads to decreases in tolerance. Third, I elaborate on how 
positive news also matters in reflecting positive attitudes towards groups. Fourth, I 
examine how and why more frequent exposure to news effects tolerance of groups. The 
final section explains how group contact plays a role in mitigating the effect of news 
exposure on tolerance.  
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Figure 2.1: Graphical Depiction of Theory 
 
The Media:  
 In what ways does the media affect public opinion? Scholars have worked 
extensively to answer this question and it is well accepted that our political beliefs are 
shaped in part by the political information we receive directly or indirectly from mass 
media. Numerous studies have demonstrated that the media has the power to shape 
public perceptions and political preferences ( McCombs, 2014: Djerf-Pierre and 
Shenhata, 2017; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Scheufele & 
Tewksbury, 2007: Krosnick and Kinder, 1990; Rogers and Dearing, 1996; Iyengar, 1991; 
Neuman, Just, and Crigler, 1992). Early scholars of media effects recognized the far-
reaching power of the media to shape and mold mass attitudes. Amongst the earliest 
works are Lasswell (1938, 1972) and Lippman (1992). These scholars demonstrated that 
use of mass media propaganda during the early twentieth century successfully increased 
public support for World War I.  
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 Early work on media effects argued that the media has expansive reach in shaping 
and molding opinions. Consumers of mass media were seen as victims who could be 
easily manipulated. It was not until the midcentury where scholar began to pull back and 
clarify early findings on media effects. For example, in 1960 Joseph Klapper argued that 
the mass media “does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but 
rather functions among and through a nexus of mediating factors and influences” (8; 
1960). While decades of research have concluded that the media plays a significant role in 
influencing public opinion, recent scholarship has developed a more nuanced view of the 
media’s role in the development of mass attitudes. The idea is that the media does not 
necessarily dictate “public opinion but rather engages in more subtle processes in which 
they respond to how individuals acquire and process information and trigger cognitive 
and affective reactions by the public” (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2011, p.10). In the subsequent 
section of this chapter, I will discuss the emerging body of literature that highlights 
complex ways in which the media influences public attitudes, and how it relates to 
support of my overall theory.   
Agenda Setting:  
Research has shown media may influence political thinking by agenda setting. 
Specifically, the media plays a role in telling people what to think about through the 
issues they cover more prominently and frequently (Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar; 
2016; Sheafer, 2007). The amount of media attention devoted to certain issues increases 
their accessibility and subsequently influences the degree of public concern for these issues 
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Chyi & McCombs, 2004). Among 
23 
 
the earliest work to identify the agenda-setting function of mass media was McCombs and 
Shaw (1972) who conducted a study in which they asked survey respondents to name the 
“main things…government should concentrate on doing something about.” (McCombs 
et al.; 2004) They found that the issues respondents named, were the same issues that 
were stressed in the newspaper and television coverage of the campaign. The authors 
suggested that the media plays a role in setting the agenda for the public and shaping 
reality. The public learns not only about a given issue, “but also how much importance to 
attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position” 
(McCombs & Shaw; 1972). The media not only identifies key issues and topics of the day, 
it also has the ability to influence the salience of these issues and topics (McCombs, 2014).  
 Barnard Cohen famously stated, the media “may not be successful much of the 
time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling [people] what 
to think about” (Choen, 1964). While there has been a great increase in the types of 
communication channels and outlets available to the public, one critical element has 
remained the same: the information that people receive is “a second-hand reality that is 
structured by journalists’ reports about these events and situations” (McCombs, 1, 2014). 
As socialist Robert Parks explains, when journalists select specific events and issues, they 
focus our attention and influence our perceptions of what are the most important issues of 
the day. A significant amount of research on agenda setting has studied the relationship 
between the amount and prominence of coverage and the public’s perceived importance 
of those issues. While the outcomes of the studies have been mixed, many share a 
common conclusion of a positive correlation and a causal relationship between the 
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emphasis that mass media places on certain issues and the importance attributed to these 
issues by the public (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Shoemaker & Reese,1991, 1996; Cobb & 
Elder, 1971; Turk, 1986; McCombs, 2018; Iyengar & Kinder; 2010; McCombs, 2005; 
Iyengar, 1991; Perse, 2001; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Gilens, 2003; Cacciatore, 
Scheufele, &s Iyengar, 2016). 
Priming:  
 Priming is another effective way in which the media influences public opinion. 
Scholars have built upon the study of agenda setting by developing an understanding of 
the consequences of agenda setting for public opinion (Iyengar and Kinder,2010). 
Priming refers to “the effects of the content of the media on people’s later behavior or 
judgments related to the content that was processed” (Roskos-Ewoldsen et al. 2009, pg. 
75). When forming an opinion, individuals will rarely engage in a comprehensive analysis 
based on their total store of information. Rather citizens frequently draw upon small bits 
of information that are particularly salient at the time the opinion is being made (Popkin, 
1994). In other words, citizens selectively rely on the information that is most salient in 
their mind when reaching opinion. By priming, the media can activate particular 
constructs in our memories, which may result in specific thoughts becoming more 
influential and available when reaching an opinion or making a decision (Ratcliff and 
McKoon, 1988).  Priming is seen as an extension to agenda setting (Iyengar and Kinder, 
1987), because the media first makes some issues more salient in people’s minds (agenda 
setting) and in turn the media can also shape the considerations that individuals take into 
account when making judgments about political candidates and issues (priming).  Many 
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scholars have demonstrated that media coverage of a topic serves as a prime influence on 
how the public formulates political opinions, including how they evaluate the effectiveness 
of political leaders (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010, 1982; Krosnick and Kinder, 1990; 
Josephson, 1987). For example, if the issue of the economy is primed by the media, it 
would become the basis for evaluating the political leader’s performance (Iyengar & 
Simon, 1993; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; Pan & Kosicki, 1997). 
Framing:  
A particularly important aspect of media studies is the significant role media plays 
in affecting public opinion by framing issues in different ways. My research focuses on this 
dimension of media effects by supporting and further detailing how through framing, 
media affects tolerance of groups.  Framing refers to the “subtle alterations in the 
statement or presentation of judgment and choice problems” (Iyengar, 1991, p.11) 
Scholars have consistently demonstrated that the media can shape political opinion by 
framing issues in distinct ways (Gamson et al. 1992, Iyengar 1991, Zaller, 1992; Nelson 
and Kinder 1996, Nelson etal., 1997; Druckman, 2001, Chong and Druckman, 2007; 
Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007; Haynes et al., 2016). In essence, the alternative phrasing 
of the same basic issue can significantly alter the meaning to an individual. From this 
literature we learn that alteration of frames by politicians and news media shapes and 
alters opinions of individuals (Gamson et al. 1992, Iyengar 1991, Nelson and Kindar 
1996).  
Frames can include both visual and verbal material, which can have significant 
consequences for how viewers perceive and understand an issue, and in turn can direct 
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the formation of individual opinions about a controversy (Iyengar 1991, Nelson and 
Kinder 1996). Specifically, frames may shape individual opinion by stressing a specific 
element or feature of a broader controversy (Neslon, Oxley, and Clawson, 1997). For 
example, Sniderman and Theriault (2004) find that when government spending on 
programs for the poor is framed as improving economic outcomes, individuals 
overwhelmingly support increased spending. However, when the same issue is framed as 
resulting in higher taxes, individuals tend to oppose increased spending.  
One important impact framing has on public opinion is shifting support or 
opposition to public decisions. For example, Haynes et al (2016) demonstrated that 
different frames on immigration have important effects on shaping opinions of specific 
policies that affect undocumented individuals. The media can contribute to transforming 
which issues and policies elites and politicians focus on through framing (Auerbach and 
Bloch-Elkon, 2005). Frames have a significant effect on how individuals perceive and 
understand an issue, which can also lead to the formation of specific opinions about a 
controversy (Iyengar 1991; Nelson and Kinder, 1996).  
Through the use of framing, media can reduce a very complex event or issue into a 
centralized and simplified perspective (Nelson et al. 1997). 
Tone of Media Coverage:  
An important way in which scholars have explored framing effects is through the 
study of coverage tone. Tone provides for a more detailed understanding of the ideas we 
develop in our minds and the subsequent attitudes and opinions that are derived from 
these ideas (McCombs; 2002). Scholars have found that coverage tone can shift public 
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opinion and attitudes of individuals (Kepplinger et al. 1989; Shaw, 1999). For example, 
the shifting pattern of positive and negative media tone influenced approval levels of 
Helmet Kohl in Germany between 1975 and 1984 (Kepplinger et al. 1989). A similar 
finding is also present in the United States where tone of television coverage about key 
campaign events has been shown to influence voters’ preferences for candidates (Shaw, 
1999). Positively toned converge of Democratic campaign events decreased support for 
the Republican candidates, while positively toned coverage of Republican campaign 
events increased support for the Republican candidate. Tone of converge not only affects 
public opinion of leaders and political parties (Zaller 1992, 1996; Norris et al. 1999; 
Fournier et al., 2004), but is also found to influence public perceptions of economic health 
(Blood and Philips; 1995) and views towards immigrants (Van Klingeren et al. 2014). For 
example, scholars have found that positive tones in reporting on immigration issues has 
the power to reduce negative attitudes towards immigration (Haynes et al., 2016; 
Abrajano et al. 2017). 
The way in which media reports and presents information plays a major role in 
the attitudes and opinions people develop (Hamill, Wilson, and Nisbett, 1980; Gamson et 
al. 1992, Iyengar 1991, Nelson and Kinder 1996; Chong & Durckman, 2007; Neslon, 
Oxley, & Clawson, 1997).  In a study conducted at the University of Michigan (Hamill, 
Wilson, and Nisbett, 1980) Hamill and colleagues randomly assigned some of their 
participants to read a short article containing a “vivid and unflattering description of a 
mother of three living in New York City who had been on welfare for the last thirteen 
years”. The other group was not given an article to read. The authors found that 
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participants who were given the article expressed significantly more negative views about 
welfare recipients in general than did subjects who had not read the article. This work 
suggests that a single article can influence readers views. I argue and demonstrate in my 
dissertation that multiple exposure to media has effects beyond that of a single story.  
Why Negative Media Leads to Intolerance 
Among the seminal works detailing mechanisms by which negative information 
influences opinion is Lau (1982).  Lau refers to the figure ground hypothesis, which suggests 
that most of the time, most individuals live a positive life where they are overall satisfied 
with their jobs, families, friends, living situation, and experiences (Campbell, Converse, 
and Rodgers, 1976; Lau, Sears, and Centers, 1979; Matlin and Stang, 1978; Sears, 1983).  
Negative information stands out in this overall positive environment because it is 
infrequent. Most individuals expect others in their community to be similar to “everyone 
else-basically good, likable people”. Given these expectations, negative information is 
highly salient and as a result, individual opinions are negatively influenced when 
confronted with negative information about a person or group. Recall that in the case of 
Muslims, media coverage employs particularly strong negative frames and terms such as 
“terrorist”, “violent”, “extremist”, etc.  These terms are in stark contrast with an overall 
positive environment, and the idea that Muslims are “basically good”.  Therefore, 
exposure to media coverage using these types of negative frames would be expected to 
decrease perceptions of Muslims, including tolerance judgments.   
The cost-orientation hypothesis is a second mechanism detailing the cognitive effects of 
negative information.  Lau (1982, 1985) suggests that people are more strongly motivated 
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to avoid costs (in the general sense) than seek gains.  The cost-orientation hypothesis further 
argues that the effects of negative information should be especially strong when the stakes 
are high, and that humans are predisposed to avoid costs to ensure survival.  Some of the 
negative frames used to cover Muslim salient issues can be construed as particularly 
costly, and as such would be expected to negatively affect individual opinions of Muslims.  
For example, frames related to “the spread of Shariah” law may be considered 
particularly risky in light of perceived incompatibility with American values and 
democratic norms.  I expect exposure to these types of negative frames to reduce 
tolerance of Muslim Americans.    
More recent work suggests that individual judgments are constantly influenced by 
heuristics and biases (Sunstein, 2006). The idea is that individuals have “rapid, immediate 
reactions to persons, activities, and processes, and the immediate reaction operates as a 
mental short cut for a more deliberative or analytic assessment of the underlying issues” 
(Solvic, 2000, 414).  In short, people rely on heuristics to simplify their judgements.  For 
example, when asked “whether Americans should be fearful of a terrorist attack?”, people 
are far more likely to be frightened and concerned if they can easily think of relevant 
example. “Attribute substitution” is another example where a simplification process can 
negatively affect tolerance judgments.   In this case, individuals answer a difficult question 
by substituting an easier one from the most readily available information heuristics 
(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982).  Negative media provides negative heuristics 
that individuals use to create mental shortcuts when forming opinions, which would be 
expected to negatively affect tolerance.  
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 Negative media can also increase the perception of threat, which in turn may lead 
to a decrease in tolerance. Extensive research has demonstrated perceived threat as one of 
the most powerful and pervasive effects on tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 
1982; Gibson, 1992; Gibson 1998; Gibson & Bingham, 1982; Kuzma, 2000; Marcus, 
Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995; Davis and Silver 2004; Davis 2007; Merolla and 
Zechmeister 2007, 2009).  Intolerance is thought to be directly related to the perception 
of threat posed by dissenting groups (Stouffer, 1955). The idea is that dissident groups 
threaten values important to the public, or otherwise constitute a danger to the 
constitutional order (Sullivan et al. 1981). This threat, real or perceived leads to increased 
prejudice against a threatening out-group (Bettencourt et al. 2001).  Many negative media 
frames of Muslims relate to intensely threatening ideas.  For example, coverage of the 
proposed Temecula Mosque construction included comments from community leaders 
suggesting that the Mosque would turn Temecula into a “haven” for Islamic Extremism 
and the spread of Sharia Law, which are likely considered to threaten both life and 
democratic values, thereby reducing tolerant judgements. 
 Although there is little work specifically detailing the effects of negative media on 
tolerance of Muslim-Americans, I believe that existing scholarly works enable 
establishment of expectations and a testable hypothesis.  Published works demonstrating 
the effects of negative media on tolerance of other out-groups in conjunction with 
scholarly literature on the cognitive effects of negative information, lead me to believe 
that when individuals are exposed to negative coverage discussing Muslims, individuals 
will be less likely to express tolerant judgments of Muslims: 
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H1: Exposure to negative media coverage decreases tolerance of Muslims. 
Why Positive Media Leads to Increases in Tolerance 
Scholars have identified individual level processes supporting why positive 
information plays a role in shifting public opinion. This work finds that individuals’ 
opinions are driven by cognitive weighting. In this conception, “more attention is given to 
information that is regarded as unique or novel, which tends to be information that is 
more extreme (e.g., Fiske 1980)” (Soroka; 2006). In the case of Muslims Americans, 
positive media represents extremely unique and novel information in the context of 
overwhelmingly negative media coverage in the environment (see chapter 1). This leads 
to an expectation that unique positive information would capture more attention, thereby 
positively impacting opinion formation, including tolerance.  
The cognitive weighting model is also consistent and supported by the learning model, 
which holds that mass media messages influence individuals’ opinions by providing “new 
information” about an issue (Graber, 1994). For example, if an individual was unaware 
that building an Islamic Center in their community could potentially lead to positive 
outcomes, exposure to media coverage suggesting that the new Mosque will boost the 
local economy would be expected to positively influence opinions towards Muslims.  
Positive information can also have a significant impact on opinions by the way in 
which information is presented through visual and verbal material in news stories. As 
elaborated earlier, this type of framing can shape opinions by stressing specific elements 
or features of the broader issue or story, which in turn can reduce a complex issue down 
to one or two central aspects (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson; 1997). For example, consider 
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coverage of the proposed Temecula Mosque emphasizing positive ideas, such as the 
constitutional right for Muslims to practice their religion, while presenting visual images 
of community members carrying signs indicating support for the mosque. This story 
distills a complex issue into a set of positive central ideas, which in turn would be 
expected to have a positive effect on opinion formation. The emphasis on these positive 
messages can “translate into differing tolerance levels among observers of these frames” 
(Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson, pg. 568, 1997).   
While the effects of positive media coverage on tolerance of Muslims has yet to be 
fully studied, existing literature detailing processes whereby positive media influences 
opinion formation, along with scholarly work demonstrating the effects of positive media 
in the context of other groups, lead to the development of a specific hypothesis.  I expect 
positive coverage to lead to increases in tolerant judgments.   
H2: Exposure to positive media coverage increases tolerance of Muslims 
Why Frequency of Media Exposure Matters 
In a strong democratic society there is an expectation that media presents multiple 
competing viewpoints (Prothro and Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964). The public’s job is to 
receive and grapple with these competing viewpoints to form public preferences.  When 
the same or similar viewpoint is repeated, it leaves little room for competing points of 
view.  For example, Vergeer et al (2000) found that individuals who were frequently 
exposed to Dutch newspapers that characterized immigrants in a negative way, expressed 
significantly increased ethnic threat perceptions.  Similarly, Schluter and Davidov (2013) 
found that in Spain, frequent exposure to negative news about immigrants lead to 
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“perceived group threat above and beyond the effects of immigrant group size” (pg. 270).  
Importantly, greater frequency also leads to significant effects for positive media. Schemer 
(2012) found that frequent exposure to positive news reduced negative out-group attitudes 
among those who are less knowledgeable about immigrants.  
Individuals are unable to simultaneously process large number of ideas, and as a 
result “political judgments and evaluations are based on only a subset of all potentially 
relevant thoughts, feelings, or other considerations” (Zaller, 1992). Media coverage alone 
brings associated beliefs and feelings to the forefront of conscious thought (Iyengar, 1991; 
Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and Shapiro, 1994; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Zaller 
1992). When information is frequently repeated, it becomes easily accessible and retrieved 
when making decisions (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley; 1997). For example, an individual 
repeatedly exposed to negative portrayals of Muslims would be more likely to have these 
negative ideas at the forefront of their conscious thought than someone who was exposed 
only once. This leads to an expectation that repeated exposure in this case, would create a 
larger negative effect than a single story in reducing tolerance judgements.  Using similar 
logic, I expect more frequent positive exposure to lead to significant increases in tolerance 
when compared to single exposure.   
Specific characteristics of negative media may be related to the enhancing effects 
of frequency.  Recall the cost-orientation hypothesis, which suggests that people are 
motivated to avoid risk.  A risk or threat that is familiar will be seen as more serious than 
a risk that is less familiar (Sunstein (2007). Berlyne (1970) demonstrated that as 
information is repeated it becomes more familiar.  As discussed above, much of the 
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negative media involving Muslim salient issues may be construed as particularly risky. 
Therefore, I expect repeated negative frames of Muslims will correspondingly enhance 
the effects of negative media exposure. 
Careful review of the above literature leads me to expect that more frequent 
exposure to positively or negatively toned coverage will have corresponding increased 
effects on tolerance.  I expect that when individuals are exposed to repeated positive or 
negative news stories this will make the issue more relatively accessible and thus have a 
greater potential to influence their judgments and opinions.  Specifically, I formulate the 
following hypotheses: 
H3: Individuals more frequently exposed to negatively toned coverage will express 
increasing levels of intolerance  
H4: Individuals more frequently exposed to positively toned coverage will express 
increasing levels of tolerance 
Contact 
In addition to understanding how media affects tolerance, my research seeks to 
address a second important dimension. Specifically, to what extent does group contact 
affect tolerance judgements, and how do these effects interact with media frames (positive 
and negative) and frequency? Scholars have previously examined the effect of group 
contact on tolerance and many have argued that intergroup contact is one of the most 
effective strategies for improving intergroup relations (Allport, 1954, 1979; Amir, 1969; 
Cook, 1985; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Watson, 1947). The inter-
group contact hypothesis states “interaction between individuals belonging to different 
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groups will influence the attitudes and behavior between members of these different 
groups” (Stein et al. 2000, pg. 285). In 1943, F. Tredwell Smith conducted a study in 
which white Columbia University students had a series of intellectual contacts with black 
leaders in Harlem. The author found that the students who had the interaction 
demonstrated significant improvements in their attitudes towards African Americans, 
which was not the case for students who did not experience interracial contact.   
The literature has identified many prerequisite conditions for group contact to 
successfully reduce intergroup conflict. Allport’s (1954/1979) highly influential Contact 
Hypothesis argued that there are four prerequisite features for contact to be successful. 
These include: 1) equal status: when different groups engage equally in the a relationship 
2) Intergroup cooperation: groups work together for a common goal without competition 
3) Common goals; when groups work to solve a problem together and 4) Support of 
authorities, law, or customs: groups must agree and respect some authority that supports 
the contact between the groups. The contact should also be positive and not include 
ingroup- outgroup comparisons. Many scholars have supported Allport’s formulation. 
Brewer and Kramer (1985) found that contact is more effective at reducing bias when 
groups enter the contact situation with equal status.  
Several other factors have been identified in the literature as critical conditions for 
successful intergroup contact. One is the “opportunity for personal acquaintance between 
members” of groups (Dovidio, Gaertner, and Kawakami; 2003, pg. 8). Specifically. Miller 
(2002) argues that the “trust implicit in personalized communication reduces anxiety and 
discomfort” (p.397). Simultaneously, these processes provide an opportunity to disconfirm 
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negative stereotypes of disliked out-groups, and thereby break down the monolithic 
perception of the out-group as a homogenous unit. A second factor that has been 
identified as critical for successful intergroup contact is friendship. Pettigrew (1997) 
examined the responses of over 3800 majority group members in probability samples 
from France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and West Germany, and found that people 
with out-group friends had significantly lower levels of bias towards that group, and the 
development of intergroup friendship played a critical role in the way that contact 
reduced bias.  
Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of 203 studies on 
intergroup contact as an influence on varied measures of prejudice. They found 94 
percent of these studies had an inverse relationship between contact and prejudice. 
Specifically, they argued that successful contact with members of one out-group, could 
extend to greater tolerance and willingness to interact with other out-groups. We know 
that interpersonal conversations permeate the political world, and a failure to consider 
their impact can lead to misleading conclusions about the media's impact on tolerance. It 
is important to learn the extent to which contact with individuals from other groups can 
mitigate or enhance the effects of media on tolerance.  
Pettigrew (1998) and others suggest four specific, related mechanisms whereby 
contact effects may increase tolerance: 1) Learning about the outgroup, 2) Changing 
behavior, 3) Generating affective ties, and 4) Ingroup reappraisal.  The learning model 
holds that “new learning corrects negative views of the outgroup, [and] contact should 
reduce prejudice” (Pettigrew 1998).  For example, Stephan and Stephan (1984) found 
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that contact between Anglo and Chicano students enabled a learning process whereby 
Anglo students’ attitudes towards their Chicano classmates were improved.  I expect 
similar learning in the case of contact with Muslims leads to corresponding increases in 
tolerance.  Recall the learning model discussed above as a cognitive means whereby positive 
media exposure may increase tolerance.  I also expect learning related to contact and 
positive media to lead to enhanced effects in creating more tolerant judgements. 
Contact may also lead to behavioral changes, which in turn lead to improved 
attitudes towards outgroups.  The idea is that new behavior can be a precursor to attitude 
changes and that contact may force behavior that is accepting of out-group members 
thereby challenging one’s expectations and shifting attitudes (Pettigrew 1998).  In the case 
of Muslims, contact may challenge expectations developed from overwhelmingly negative 
media coverage thereby exerting a moderating effect and increasing tolerance.  It is worth 
noting that this behavioral mechanism may benefit from repeated experiences (Jackman 
& Crane 1986), and that external benefits reinforce and enhance its effects (Pettigrew 
1998). 
Contact is particularly effective in moderating negative emotions and increasing 
positive emotions associated with outgroups, which in turn improves attitudes. Contact, 
especially repeated contact, is thought to reduce anxiety (Pettigrew 1998), which can lead 
to increases in tolerance.  Empathy and friendship also play important roles.  For 
example, Reich & Purbhoo (1975) found that empathy towards a single stigmatized 
outgroup member can improve attitudes towards the group as a whole and Rippl (1995) 
found friendship to be a critical factor in determining attitudes between East and West 
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Germans.  I expect contact with Muslims acts though multiple emotional pathways to 
reduce anxiety, increase empathy, and improve the likelihood of friendship, which may 
all lead to increased tolerance.  This emotional pathway may be a particular way in 
which contact and negative media interact. Specifically, contact may reduce anxieties 
related to risk and threat associated with exposure to negative media, thereby exerting a 
moderating effect.  
Finally, positive outgroup contact experiences may create new perspectives that 
cause individuals to reevaluate attitudes towards their own group (Pettigrew 1998).  The 
amount of contact is thought to play an important role in this case.  The idea is that 
contact, especially friendship simply reduces the amount of time an individual spends 
with their own ingroup.  Mullen and others (1992) showed that ingroup biases were 
closely associated with ingroup salience.  As individuals spend more time in contact with 
Muslims, I similarly expect biases to decrease, thereby increasing tolerance.   
While the effects of both contact and media exposure represent significant areas of 
study, the specific effects in the case of Muslim-Americans have yet to be fully detailed.  
However, careful review of the above literature leads me to formulate the following 
testable hypothesis related contact and interactions with media: 
H5: Contact with a member of an out-group increases tolerant attitudes  
H6: Contact with a member of an out-group mitigates decreases in tolerance caused by 
negative media exposure. 
H7: Contact with a member of an out-group interacts with positive media exposure to 
enhance tolerance.  
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Conclusion:  
 Together, previous research supports my expectations that media exposure 
matters.  Specifically, the media plays a role in increasing the perceived importance of an 
issue, which in turn may affect attitudes towards groups. Media content has been shown 
to affect the importance viewers attach to different issues (Gilens, 1999). Scholars have 
argued when media presents both side of an issue, public opinion changes only slightly. 
However, when only one side is presented, public opinion responds to the dominant 
message (Zaller 1992; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Gershkoff 
and Kushner 2005). While we know media reporting on Muslim Americans has been 
overwhelmingly negative, I argue that exposure to this increased negative reporting 
creates intolerant attitudes towards Muslim Americans.  Based on the body of research 
reviewed in this chapter, I argue and expect that the more an individual is exposed to 
positive tone media coverage, the more tolerant they will become.  Conversely, the more 
an individual is exposed to negative tone of coverage, the less tolerant they will become. 
Using Muslim Americans as a case study, and a mixed methods approach that relies on 
both quantitative (laboratory experiments) and qualitative (interviews) methods, I will 
demonstrate in my research how the media plays a role in affecting tolerance judgments 
and how contact may mitigate the effects of media in the case of negative coverage, while 
enhancing the effects of positive coverage. 
 
 
 
40 
 
Chapter 3: A Closer Look: Content Analysis of Media and Interviews with 
Temecula Residents 
 
“So far as the United States seems to be concerned, it is only a slight 
overstatement to say that Moslems and Arabs are essentially seen as either oil 
suppliers or potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the human density, the 
passion of Arab-Moslem life has entered the awareness of even those people 
whose profession it is to report the Arab world. What we have instead is a series 
of crude, essentialized caricatures of the Islamic world presented in such a way as 
to make that world vulnerable to military aggression” (Edward Said; 1980)  
 
Edward Said, one of the twentieth century’s most influential thinkers, was among the first 
to recognize a common narrative surrounding overtly negative media representations of 
Islam, Muslim, and Arabs. Contemporary scholars have argued that media has 
consistently portrayed negative characterizations of Muslims both before and after the 
tragic events of September 11, 2001 (Gershkoff and Kushner, 2005; Reese, 2007; Powell 
and Abadi, 2003, Lajevardi, 2017, Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018). Multiple studies have 
found that the American public evaluates Muslim Americans more negatively than all 
other racial, ethnic, or religious groups (Edgell, Gerteis and Hartmann 2006; Putnam and 
Campbell 2010; Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018). Scholars argue that these negative 
evaluations are due in part to overwhelmingly negative media coverage (Lajevardi 2017).  
As explained in earlier chapters, my research is focused on understanding the 
media’s role in influencing tolerance of Muslim Americans. Before investigating the 
effects of positively and negatively framed coverage, coverage frequency, and contact, it 
was important to develop a comprehensive understanding of the specific frames and 
language used by the media to characterize Muslim salient topics.  Although the effects 
of negative and positive frames have been studied, the specific relationship between the 
types of frames used to characterize Islam and Muslims and their effects on tolerance 
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have yet to be thoroughly characterized.  In this chapter, I employ a detailed content 
analysis of over 40 articles related to the 2010 proposed construction of a Mosque in 
Temecula, CA.  I further utilized phone interviews of both pro- and anti-Mosque 
Temecula residents to collect detailed qualitative data related to perceptions of Muslims 
and how these perceptions relate to media and contact.  Importantly, the interview 
process enabled open ended questions that were particularly helpful in informing the 
design of experiments for later chapters, especially with respect to the particular frames 
to use. 
When an announcement was made in May 2010 for the proposed construction of 
an Islamic and Cultural Center near Ground Zero, opposition and protests from 
democrats and republicans quickly intensified in New York City, and rapidly spread 
across the county. In the decade since, there has been a spike in anti-Muslim sentiment, 
which has manifested in attacks on Muslims, and existing and proposed mosque sites. 
These attacks have included vandalism, criminal acts, and increased efforts to block or 
deny necessary permits for construction or expansion of mosques (ACLU, 2019). The 
American Civil Liberties Union has compiled data on mosque attacks since 2005, which 
is shown in Figure 3.1.  While ACLU data is striking, they themselves acknowledge their 
data is not comprehensive of all attacks, and is likely missing data related to incidents 
that were not reported by news media.   
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Figure 3.1: Anti- Mosque Incidents Across the United States since 2005  
 
 
Of particular note to my dissertation, one incident that received both considerable 
media attention and public opposition was the proposed construction of a Mosque in the 
city of Temecula, California. Opponents collected hundreds of signatures, bombarded 
city planners with angry letters and e-mails, and staged protests with bullhorns and dogs 
(usually during Friday prayers, which is the busiest time for mosques) (Flaccus, 
Huffington Post, May 2011). Many of the protesters expressed opposition because they 
believed Islam was a radical religion. For example, during her protest, Zorina Bennett, 
50, of Temecula argued “this is America. This is a Christian country, this is not a Muslim 
country. They are known terrorists, Read the Koran. They are trained to kill people from 
the time they’re in their youth” (LA Times, Willon, 2010). The proposal for the Mosque 
was not new. The Temecula Islamic Center had purchased the site 10 years prior and had 
been saving money to build the new center. Importantly, they did not encounter 
opposition or resistance until planning work coincided with the media coverage of the 
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proposed Park 51 Islamic Center in New York City (Flaccus, Huffington Post, May 
2011). This suggests that the media may be influencing tolerance judgements towards 
Muslim Americans. 
To provide a more thorough picture of how the media has represented Muslims, I 
conducted a content analysis of stories that discussed the proposed construction of an 
Islamic Center and Mosque in the city of Temecula. I expected that the majority of the 
coverage would be negative as there was significant opposition coinciding with negative 
coverage of Park 51. I collected all newspaper articles that directly referenced the words: 
Temecula, Mosque, Islamic Center, from the stories released from May 2010 (coinciding 
with the release of Park 51 coverage) to December 2010, when coverage began to slow 
down. This totaled 42 articles, which provided a great diversity of news sources that 
included moderate, liberal and conservative viewpoints. The articles featured several 
quotes that captured opinions of religious and political leaders, other community elites, in 
addition to citizens of Temecula. I first assessed 15 articles to develop an overall idea of 
article frames: positive, negative or conflicting. In that process, I also began to identify 
the main reasons that individuals cited in expressing opposition or support for the center. 
Overall, my content analysis revealed that a considerable majority (about 70%) of the 42 
articles were overwhelmingly negative, and only about 10% were positive.  The 
remaining 20% were conflicting; including both positive and negative information. Table 
3.1 provides a list of the primary reasons cited for opposition or support specifically 
mentioned in the articles.  
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Table 3.1: Content Analysis of News Stories Discussing Temecula Mosque 
Controversy 
 
Reasons for Opposition  
Number of 
Articles Reasons for Support  
Number of 
Articles 
1. Fear of extremist activity   36 
1.mosque passed all 
city environment and 
traffic requirements  4 
2. Traffic problem  8 
2. Freedom to practice 
religion  7  
3. Protest letters and 
signature  18 
3. Threat to religious 
freedom  3 
4. fear of Muslims taking 
over/ "Islamization of 
America"/  24 
4. Opposition goes 
against constitutional 
protection  2 
5. Obama supports/ speaks 
positive about NY Mosque 
building/ Muslims religious 
freedom  6 
5. Interfaith; other 
religious groups 
showing support 5 
6. Islam encourages 
violence    
6. Mentioning 
knowing/ contact with 
Muslims  2 
7. Related to terrorism  14     
8. Islam is not a religion  3     
9. Islam and Muslims are 
not compatible with being 
American and American 
way of life  15     
7. Mentioning NO contact 
with a Muslim  7     
8. Fear of spread of sharia 
law 17     
9. Fear of Islam as domestic 
threat  32     
    
    
The results from my content analysis lead to several important conclusions. First, 
the articles identified more reasons for opposition to building the Temecula Islamic 
Center than reasons to support. I also note that the articles more frequently addressed 
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negative reasons for opposition than positive reasons for support, which is a subtle, but 
important distinction. One particularly striking example related to terrorism, fear of 
extremist activity, and fear of Islam as a domestic threat was an August 2010 TIME 
article citing the Pastor of Calvary Baptist Church (located directly across from the 
proposed mosque site) who stated Islam and Christianity are like “oil and water”, and that 
Islam is “intolerant at its core. The Islamic foothold is not strong here, and we really don't 
want to see their influence spread…There is a concern with all the rumors you hear about 
sleeper cells and all that. Are we supposed to be complacent just because these people say 
it's a religion of peace? Many others have said the same thing." He added that when Islam 
becomes dominant in a society “you also see a repression of freedom of speech and 
religious expression. In my view, building a mosque in Temecula would act as a magnet. 
It would embolden the more aggressive acting on the beliefs.” (TIME, Aug 2010).  
Fear that the mosque would harbor extremists (86% of articles) and spread sharia 
law (40%) were common themes that emerged in the articles.  These ideas are in stark 
contrast to scholarship showing that there is no systematic data to support the claim that 
mosque involvement, or religiosity is associated with anti-American attitudes or behavior 
among American Muslims (Dana, Barreto and Oskooii, 2011). Rather Dana, Barreto and 
Oskooii’s (2011) findings suggest that an association exists between higher levels of 
involvement in mosque-related activities and participation in American politics.  
Specifically, they argue “overwhelmingly, mosques help Muslims integrate into US 
society, and in fact have a very productive role in bridging the differences between 
Muslims and non-Muslims in the United States” (pg. 517). 
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While the reasons of support for the Temecula mosque were less prominent, one 
common theme that emerged discussed how like other religious groups in the United 
States, Muslims also have a constitutional right to freely worship. For example, one 
Temecula resident stated “the Constitution protects the right of all citizens to worship as 
they see fit. If we deny that right to one group, we endanger freedom of worship for 
everyone” (Neff, LA Times, 2010). Several articles also mentioned the support that the 
mosque received from other religious groups and community members. Temecula 
mosque members expressed gratitude for the support they received from community 
members from all faiths and beliefs. The chairman of the Temecula mosque stated “This 
is much better than I could have even expected. It helps show that we are part of this 
community, that we belong here” (Willon, LA Times, 2010).  
Only two articles mentioned positive contact between Temecula residents and a 
Muslim(s).  I believe this helps to explain the strong opposition to the mosque. One 
example suggesting the role of positive contact in creating tolerant judgments was an 
August 2010 TIME article citing resident Briana Bowers, 16, who mentioned that she has 
Muslim friends and that at her school several discussions have risen in her classrooms 
about the mosque. Her overall conclusion was her “Muslim friends observe that there are 
dozens of churches in town and wonder what is wrong with building one mosque…I 
think it would broaden the culture in Temecula."  My subsequent chapter on contact 
supports previous research that argues that contact is one of the most effective strategies 
for improving intergroup relations (Allport, 1954, 1979; Amir, 1969; Cook, 1985; 
Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Watson, 1947). As Miller (2002) argues 
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contact “reduces anxiety and discomfort.... [while] simultaneously, these processes 
provide an opportunity to disconfirm negative stereotypes of disliked out-groups, and 
thereby break down the monolithic perception of the out-group as a homogenous unit” (p. 
397). Since contact between Muslims and other Temecula city residents is low, I expect a 
lower likelihood of observing these positive outcomes. 
An absence of contact with Muslims creates a greater likelihood that false 
information is spread by those who oppose the mosque. This was observed in serval 
articles citing a fear of extremist activity and potential traffic problems. In one example, 
Ron Patterson, a 65-year-old retired mail man mentioned that he signed a petition to stop 
the building of the mosque, after a lady had canvassed his neighborhood telling him that 
over 3,000 people would be attending the mosque during at least 3 services a day, and 
that these services will spread extreme and radical views. In a second example citing 
Islam as a domestic threat, Karen Fesini, 68, a member of the Republican women’s 
groups in the Temecula and Murrieta, said she made calls to warn her friends about the 
project. She mentioned “"They say they're not radicals, but how do we know? Right now, 
we're at war with the Taliban and the Muslims and our boys are over there fighting and 
dying for our freedom. What would it be like if they come home and found out we just let 
them in the front door?" (Los Angeles Times, July 2010). Other community members 
admitted to not personally knowing any Muslims, but also argued that the “Islamic 
religion is contrary to the American way of life” (Weiner, 2010). I believe this lack of 
contact between Muslims and other community members in the city of Temecula may 
contribute to the forming of negative opinions towards Muslims.  
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The opposition to construction of Islamic Centers in Temecula, New York, and 
across the country highlight a fundamental paradox that exists in American society. 
Specifically, the majority of Americans support the fundamental principles of democracy 
(life, freedom, liberty, equality, and pursuit of happiness) in principle, but not necessarily 
in action. For example, following the tragic attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon on September 11, 2001, Americans increased their willingness to sacrifice 
some of the civil liberties that traditionally define a liberal democracy (Skitka, Bauman, 
and Mullen, 2004; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Davis and Silver 2004; Davis 2007). I 
consistently observed this paradox in my content analysis. For example, Diana Serafin, 
59, a Temecula resident explained "we have a constitutional right to freedom of religion, 
but Islam is more than a religion. It is an ideology to enforce Shari'a law [Islamic 
jurisprudence] in America, and Shari'a law is in direct contrast to the American 
Constitution." Another example that generated significant media attention was Sarah 
Palin’s argument in opposition to Park 51 “No one is disputing that America stands for, 
and should stand for, religious tolerance. It is a foundation of our republic. This is not an 
issue of religious tolerance but of common moral sense. To build a mosque at Ground 
Zero is a stab in the heart of the families of the innocent victims of those horrific attacks” 
(McManus, LA Times). These statements illustrate a common narrative that has emerged 
in American society, in which fundamental principles of democracy are increasingly at 
risk.  
 My content analysis revels that the majority of the articles were framed in a way 
that described the opposition of the building of the Islamic Center in a negative way.  
49 
 
Fear of extremist activity (86%), fear of Islam as a domestic threat (76%), and 
Islamization of America (57%) were particularly common themes. In my subsequent 
chapters I argue and demonstrate that this type of media exposure negatively influences 
tolerance toward Muslim Americans, and more frequent coverage like this only 
exacerbates these trends.  Of particular interest considering the relative minority of 
positive articles, I further demonstrate that exposure to a single positive article leads to 
substantial positive shifts in tolerance, and that exposure to a second positive article leads 
to a second, smaller positive shift.  
Qualitative Interviews   
 The qualitative dimension of my research was particularly instructive in providing 
additional details and support for my argument. I conducted phone interviews with 
community members who resided in Temecula during the 2010 controversy surrounding 
the proposed construction of a Mosque and Islamic Center. Interviews are an extremely 
helpful and essential tool for understanding how the world works (Mosley, 2013). 
Specifically, they allow researchers to directly interact with individuals to understand and 
make sense of political phenomena. In my case, the interview process served as a first 
means of connecting common themes in the media to perceptions about the proposed 
mosque and Muslims among supporters and detractors.  Importantly, I employed several 
open-ended questions to develop contextual understandings related to media, contact, and 
how they relate to opinions of the proposed mosque.  
 In the preceding section, I found fear of Islamic extremism, fear of Islam as a 
domestic threat, and Islamization of America to be the most common themes cited in 
50 
 
news articles as reasons people expressed opposition to the proposed Temecula Islamic 
Center.  In my interviews, I used questions to discern whether these patterns were also 
prevalent in citizen’s perceptions of the Temecula Mosque. These interviews also 
allowed me to gauge whether in fact, threat is at play in influencing tolerance judgments 
related to the Temecula Mosque. Table 3.2 includes the list of questions that were used 
during the interviews: 
Table 3.2: Interview Questionnaire  
 
1. How often do you watch the news?  
2. Do you trust the media?  
3. How satisfied, unsatisfied, or indifferent are you to Trump being 
president?  
4. Did you hear about the building of the Islamic Center In Temecula?  
5. How did you hear about it?  
6. How closely were you following the story?  
7. Are there any particular features of the stories that you remember or 
found persuasive in the media or from other individuals?  
8. Where do you think these opinion (opposition and support) come from?  
9. What was your opinion on the Islamic Center? Did you support, oppose, 
or were neutral?  
10. Why did you support, oppose, or were neutral? 
11. Did you play any particular role in supporting or opposing the center?  
12. Did you feel obligated to play a role in the narrative on building the 
center?  
13. Did you do anything in particular to show your support or opposition?  
14. If yes, how did you frame these conversations with others in the 
community?  
15. What is your opinion of Muslims? 
16. Do you know any Muslims? If yes, how would you describe your 
relationship with them? (i.e. Close friends, acquaintances, neighbors)  
17. Has your opinion of the mosque changed over time? If so, why?  
18. Is there anything you would change about the media? What would you 
change about the media?  
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I first identified names of community members in the city of Temecula who have 
been quoted frequently in news articles discussing the Islamic Center of Temecula. 
Importantly, many of these were community leaders who participated in framing the 
issue for their community. I then sent out emails and called both the Islamic Center of 
Temecula and the Calvary Baptist Church (a neighboring church to the mosque) to 
request interviews. Once in contact with members of these centers, I requested referrals 
and conducted further interviews through snowball sampling. I concluded my interviews 
once I began to receive significantly similar and repeated information. In total, I 
conducted 24 interviews from April 2018 to Jan 2019. In the majority of these interviews, 
the subject had strong opinions on the Temecula Mosque.  
Throughout the interview process, I found multiple themes broadly expressed 
across interview participants. Three primary themes were repeated among supporters of 
the Temecula Islamic Center. First, a majority recognized and believed that the media 
played a significant role in creating or increasing opposition to the mosque and “hatred” 
towards Muslims.  Second, supporters noted they were able to garner support for the 
Temecula Mosque through meaningful contact.  Third, supporters generally had a 
positive outlook and cited considerable community support, despite negative coverage 
that highlighted community opposition. 
One prominent individual, who was at the time and remains a board member of 
the Islamic Center of Temecula, argued that the media “mobilized racist mentality to 
object to building the spiritual place (Temecula mosque)”. This individual further 
suggested that the opposition to the Temecula mosque began only after reporting on the 
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ground zero mosque in New York City. Other individuals expressed similar sentiments. 
One college student argued, “unfortunately, especially in the past two decades there has 
been a large focus in the media on negative things that are happening to people who may 
have names that appear to Muslims, or look like they are Muslims, or from somewhere 
that is majority Muslim. This gives the public the idea that this is what all Muslims are 
like”.  
A Muslim woman that I interviewed argued that anytime the media reported on an 
issue that discussed Muslims in a negative way, she noticed an increase in “hatred” and 
“racism” towards people in her Muslim community. She recalled driving when someone 
threw eggs at her car and yelled out racist slurs such as “go back to your country you 
terrorist” following the San Bernardino shooting. Another individual shared an emotional 
story about a trip to Target with her 3-year-old child, when a man began to follow them 
yelling “do you have a bomb under your dress”. She explained to me that she had never 
felt more scared and vulnerable in her entire life.  
Not only did the majority of mosque supporters argue that the media plays a role 
in creating opposition towards Muslims, but they also explained specific mechanisms 
they believed created these feelings: the media created fear by reporting negatively on the 
mosque. One individual argued “the media buzz definitely brought insecurity and fear 
into people. I have people at work that live in Temecula and work in Temecula…they 
don’t know the depth of the stories, they just see [a] credible number of people and 
credible media sources that are showing that there is an opposition to building a Muslim 
mosque that will bring whatever Sharia or whatever those labels, Islamophobic labels”. 
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This individual goes on to argue that exposure to this news increased fear and that 
conversations (contact) with these people in some cases dissipated this fear.  Another 
interviewee expressed a similar point of view, “media creates this sense of fear and 
distrust and called a group of people the ‘others’…so the damage is done”. These 
perceptions corroborate extensive research demonstrating perceived threat as one of the 
most powerful and pervasive effects on tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; 
Gibson, 1992; Gibson 1998; Gibson & Bingham, 1982; Kuzma, 2000; Marcus, Sullivan, 
Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995; Davis and Silver 2004; Davis 2007; Merolla and 
Zechmeister 2007, 2009), and aligns with my expectations that fear and threat lead 
people to become intolerant in the case of the Temecula Mosque. In chapters 4 and 5, I 
present survey experiments in which respondent were exposed to negatively constructed 
news stories that involved threating tones.  
The second commonly observed theme among supporters was that most 
recognized contact with different members of the community enabled them to garner 
support for the proposed new Temecula Mosque. One individual mentioned that through 
conversations with her coworkers and neighbors, she changed their outlook on the debate.  
Interestingly, several interviewees mentioned that they did not believe individuals with 
strong negative opinions on the mosque could be influenced to change those opinions. 
Rather, only individuals who are either undecided or unfamiliar with the issue could be 
influenced to support the mosque. Mosque detractors often mentioned that they did not 
have any contact with Muslim(s). Somewhat paradoxically, supporters of the mosque do 
not believe they can change the opinions of opponents through contact (although this 
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contact does not exist), while those who oppose the mosque do not have meaningful 
positive contact Muslims. This perception is striking considering scholarship arguing 
contact as one of the most effective strategies for improving relations between groups 
(Allport, 1954, 1979; Amir, 1969; Cook, 1985; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 
2006; Watson, 1947). In Chapter 5 of my dissertation, I develop an experiment where 
contact is randomly assigned to draw causal inferences related to the role contact plays in 
affecting tolerance.  
The third common theme to emerge among supporters of the Mosque was an 
overall positive outlook on the issue. Many mentioned that although there was opposition 
from members of the community, there was also a lot of support and allies as a direct 
result of opposition. One individual recalled during the nine-hour town hall meeting in 
Temecula, many individuals from other religious communities that came to speak in 
support of the mosque. One supporter noted that while the media did not adequately 
highlight support, it actually did exist.  
My content analysis highlighted a fundamental paradox in American society. The 
majority of Americans support fundamental principles of democracy (life, freedom, 
liberty, equality, and pursuit of happiness) in principle, but not necessarily in action. 
Many of those interviewed also recognized the strong opposition for the freedom to 
worship in the country whose fundamental value is to support and advocate for this right. 
One interviewee who attends the Temecula Mosque expressed sadness and concern that 
“some people want to limit our freedom”. One supporter mentioned she would “never 
forget” a particular comment at a Temecula City Council town-hall meeting. An 
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individual introduced herself as a teacher before expressing her concern the mosque 
would spread sharia law and extremism. When I asked why this example was so 
distinctive, she explained “its concerning to have a person who defines themselves as an 
educator to be advocating for something that goes against our constitution of freedom to 
worship”.  
Several common observations emerged in interviews of detractors of the proposed 
Temecula mosque. First, similar to supporters, those opposed expressed dissatisfaction 
with and distrust of the media. In particular, many believed the media over emphasized 
certain issues while ignoring others. This observation is consistent with literature finding 
large numbers of Americans no longer trust the media to report the news fairly (Jone, 
2004; Chanley et al. 2000; Dautrich and Hartley, 1999; Sabato; 1991; Patterson, 1993; 
West 2001). These low levels of trust in media should be concerning as Dautrich and 
Hartley argue:  
“Lower levels of confidence in the media may deprive the public of some of the 
essentials of democracy: a source of current information and public education 
that it can trust and a watchdog for public officials in which it has confidence. 
Without a trustworthy source of information, the public is left without the ability 
to discern the important issues of the day, the differences between candidates in 
elections, and whether what the candidates and advertisers are telling them is 
accurate. And a public that does not know which candidate stands for what may 
be less likely to vote and more likely to become cynical regarding elections. 
(Dautrich and Hartley 1999: 15) 
 
Importantly, a second common theme aligned with common themes observed in 
my content analysis. Opponents of the mosque expressed fear the mosque would be used 
as a safe haven to spread sharia law and extremism. One Temecula retiree stated, “if you 
want to see the effects of the mosque, go back to 9/11”. Another individual argued “most 
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people don’t know what Sharia law is, if they did they would not allow the mosque to be 
built”. The word “fear” was repeated by many of the interviewees. In particular they 
expressed the fear of the unknown and potential threats that the mosque would bring. 
When I asked one individual why he believed people did not support the mosque she 
stated “there was fear, and uncertainty by the way Muslims have been portrayed. Some 
people are afraid the mosque would bring in more radical people”. Another individual 
mentioned “we don’t feel safe having them close to us”.  In chapter 4, I employ 
experiments designed to expose respondents to negatively constructed news stories to 
further develop our understanding of the effects of exposure to negative news stories on 
tolerance.  
 Of particular interest to my work on contact, most interviewees who expressed 
strong opposition to the mosque, also mentioned that they did not have any contact with 
Muslims, although they had strong opinions on who they believed Muslims are. One 
attendee of the Calvary Baptist Church neighboring the mosque stated “Muslims can be a 
little more unloving and harsher. Like I said, I have not seen it myself first hand, but what 
I see from the way they treat their women and what you hear in the media”. Another 
interviewee admitted she did not personally know any Muslims or has never looked at the 
mosques website to learn about the center, but she explained “their religion goes against 
the American way of life”.   
 Some detractors expressed frustration with others who were upset about their 
opposition. One interviewee mentioned “people thought we were opposing them as 
people, but were not, we just disagree on religion”. A staff member of the Calvary Baptist 
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Church explained that they would receive calls from “angry people”. She recalled one 
caller stating, “I am gay, and I am sure you don’t support that either”. She argued that the 
beauty of living in the United states is that we have rights to express our opinions. When 
I asked about the right to worship, she said she believed in that right, but still had 
concerns that a mosque would spread extremism. This highlights the paradox that in 
conditions of threat Americans are increasingly willing to sacrifice fundamental civil 
liberties (Huddy et al. 2002). 
 Together, these interviews provide a framework to design a set of survey 
experiments that will rigorously assess the effects of media coverage and contact on 
tolerance. First, the interview process enabled open ended questions, without an 
enumerated list to guide the response. This provided additional context in the 
development of my experiment survey questions and treatment articles. Second, these 
interviews further support my expectations as they relate to media and contact. For 
example, both opponents and supporters of the Temecula mosque expressed negative 
feelings towards media, which they believed affected their opinion. Importantly, 
Temecula community members noted a marked increase in opposition coinciding with 
coverage of Park 51 in New York City.  Also, in general, detractors had little to no 
meaningful contact with Muslims. In chapters 4 and 5 of my dissertation I discuss my 
experiments in which respondents are exposed to single, and multiple positively and 
negatively framed news stories about Muslims.  I also introduce and discuss an 
experiment in which both media exposure and contact are randomly assigned, which 
uniquely enables inference of causal relationships between contact, media, and tolerance.  
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Chapter 4: Tolerance Uncovered: How Frequency of News Exposure Affects 
Tolerance of Groups 
 
Over the course of history and especially in the last decade following the tragic 
events of September 11, 2001, Muslims and Islam have been depicted negatively by the 
media who have consistently associated Islam with violence, terrorism, and 
incompatibility with democratic values (Pew Research Center, 2013; Sides & Gross, 
2013; Dixon & Williams, 2015; Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2007; Powell, 2011; Alsultany, 
2012; Shaheen, 2009; Dill, Gentile, Richter, & Dill, 2005; Šisler, 2008). Several public 
opinion surveys reveal that Muslim Americans are evaluated more negatively than any 
other racial, religious, or ethnic group (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006; Putnam and 
Campbell 2010; Pew Research Center, 2013; Sides & Gross, 2013). Given this context, 
my research is interested in examining the extent to which the media plays a role in 
influencing tolerance judgments of Muslim Americans. 
In this chapter, I ask, to what extent is tolerance affected when individuals are 
repeatedly exposed to negatively or positively framed issues about Muslim Americans? I 
argue and demonstrate that as individuals are exposed to an increasing number of 
negatively framed news articles, tolerance decreases. Conversely, tolerance increases as 
individuals are exposed to an increasing number of positively framed articles. In essence, 
frequency of exposure to negatively or positively framed articles plays a role in shifting 
attitudes towards groups. It is not only the type of exposure that matters, but also the 
amount of exposure.   In this chapter I conduct three experiments to test the following 
hypotheses:  
H1: Exposure to positively toned media coverage increases tolerance of Muslims 
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H2: Exposure to negatively toned media coverage decreases tolerance of Muslims. 
 
H3: Individuals more frequently exposed to negatively toned coverage will express 
increasing levels of intolerance  
 
H4: Individuals more frequently exposed to positively toned coverage will express  
increasing levels of tolerance 
 
I test these hypotheses with three original experiments. Experiment I was 
conducted at the University of California, Riverside using a student sample. Subjects 
were randomly assigned to a positive, negative or control treatment article to test the 
claim that media affects tolerance of Muslims. I find support for the idea that exposure to 
a positive news story increases tolerance towards Muslims. Experiment II is a larger 
national study conducted using Amazon Mechanical Turk. This experiment overlaps 
tremendously with most of the features of experiment I, but varies by increasing the 
presentation of more positive and negative stories. This study addresses one of my main 
arguments, which is that frequency of exposure to positive and negative news matters. My 
analysis provides clear evidence that frequency of exposure matters in influencing 
tolerance towards Muslims. Lastly, experiment III allows me to test for media effects on 
tolerance, as well as test how contact with a member from an out-group may mitigate the 
effect of media exposure on intolerance (discussed further in the next chapter).  
Media Exposure Effects on Tolerance (Experiments I, II, and III) 
Methods: 
I conducted three laboratory experiments to test my main hypotheses about the 
effect of repeated exposure to media fames on tolerance. A laboratory experiment is the 
best approach to test my main hypotheses about the effect of frequency of exposure of 
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media coverage on tolerance. Through random assignment of participants to control and 
treatment groups, experiments help facilitate causal inference (Druckman et al. 2006). 
Experiments are especially helpful to use when studying contextual situations whose 
impact can be difficult to gauge.  With respect to media effects, it is difficult to know 
precisely the type (positive or negative) and frequency of exposure from survey data. 
Specifically, in the case of news coverage on Muslims, we know that coverage is 
overwhelmingly negative. This makes it difficult to assess the effects of positive coverage. 
Additionally, because experimental treatments are randomly assigned, we can control for 
confounders. Through clear and transparent methods and experimental procedures of 
assigning participants to random conditions, and manipulating the independent variable, 
a laboratory experiment will provide “superior information about the causal relationship 
between independent and dependent variables” (Kinder and Palfrey, 1993).  
My experiments include both undergraduate student samples from the University 
of California, Riverside as well as an Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) sample. MTurk 
is an online platform used to recruit survey respondents by paying individuals to complete 
tasks such as answering survey questions. MTurk has become popularly used by social 
scientists because of its relatively low cost, less time required to implement a study, ease of 
use, and its potential to generate more heterogenous samples (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 
2012; Krupnikov and Levine 2014; Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). Since 
MTurk and undergraduate student respondents self-select to participate rather than being 
randomly selected from the population, there is concern that the results observed do not 
reflect what would be found with population-based samples.  A concern may be that 
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student and MTurk samples may diverge from a representative population sample in 
ways that bias the estimated treatment effect. Many scholars have found that varying 
types of convivence samples are reliable, affordable, and produce experimental effects 
similar to population-based surveys (e.g. Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Goodman, 
Cryder, and Cheema 2012; Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 2011; Krupnikov and Levine 
2014; Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010; Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan 2014; 
Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, and Freese; 2016).  
While convenience samples have been found to play a fruitful role in helping to 
progress research agendas, I am aware of some of the issues that may arise from using 
these samples and have used a number of tools to account for and try to mitigate these 
issues. One very useful tool with MTurk is that the principle investigator can accept (pay) 
or reject (not pay) a worker’s submission if “a worker makes multiple attempts at a study, 
fails an attention check, does not submit the correct end-of-survey code, answers the 
survey too fast, makes a submission but never completes the study, or for any other 
reason” (Wessling et al. 2017, pg. 218). In order to ensure that respondents were treated 
ethically, I informed the potential respondents of specific requirements of the study in the 
consent form, so they could choose if they would like to participate or not based on those 
requirements. MTurk respondents had to submit both their worker ID to prevent them 
from multiple entries, they also had to submit a unique code that was given to them at the 
end of the survey. Another concern for both MTurk and Student respondent is whether 
or not they would actually read the treatment or control articles presented to them. I 
62 
 
attempted to mitigate this problem by including screening questions. Respondents who 
answered the screening questions incorrectly were excluded from data set.  
Research Design  
Experiment I:  
My first study was launched on January 20th, 2017 and ended on February 17th, 2017 at 
University of California, Riverside and included 558 undergraduate student participants. 
Students were recruited from political sciences courses and received extra credit in 
exchange for participating in the study or reading an assigned article about experimental 
methods in political science. The majority of students selected to participate in the 
experiment instead of reading the article. Experiment I address my first and second 
hypotheses:  
H1: Exposure to positively toned media coverage increases tolerance of Muslims 
 
H2: Exposure to negatively toned media coverage decreases tolerance of Muslims. 
 
As I mentioned previously the use of a sample of undergraduate students may 
raise questions about the representativeness of my findings. Table 4.1 provides a 
summary of the demographic and political characteristics of my sample and compares it 
to the national data from the United States Census Bureau and the Pew Research Center. 
The data shows that my sample varies substantially on important demographic and 
political variables. I would expect it to be more difficult to find support for my hypotheses 
using college students since my sample is younger, more diverse, more democratic, more 
college educated, and has a higher proportion of Hispanics and Asians and less Whites. 
These demographic differences provide for a more difficult test case to find differences 
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between treatment groups. For example, scholars have consistently found that education 
is strongly related and linked to tolerance (Nunn, Crockett, and Williams, 1978; Bobo 
and Licari,1989; Prothro and Grigg, 1960; Sullivan, Pierson, Marcus, 1993; 
Stouffer,1955; Davis, 1975; Golebiowska, 1995). For this reason, I believe it is reasonable 
to assume that my sample may provide for a more rigid test of the extent to which the 
media may affect tolerance. 
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Table 4.1 Sample Characteristics for Experiment I  
  Experiment I National Sample 
Sample Size  556   
Sex      
    Female  64.70% 50.8 
    Male  35.2 49.2 
Race/ethnicity      
    Hispanic  49.4 17.8 
    Asian  21.5 5.7 
    White 11.8 76.9 
    Black  5.9 13.3 
    Middle Eastern  5.7 0.5 
    Other   4.6 7 
    Native American  0.53 0.5 
 Party Identification      
    Democrat  64.4 28 
    Independent  12.9 41 
    Don't know/Refused  8.1 1 
    Republican  7.9 25 
    Something else  6.6 1 
Religion        
    Roman Catholic  33.2 20.8 
   Nothing in particular  19.1 15.8 
   Evangelical Christian  8.6 25.4 
   Agnostic  8.4 4 
   Something else  7.7 0.3 
   Atheist  5.9 3.1 
   Protestant  5.9 14.7 
   Muslim  3.5 0.9 
   Hindu 2.1 0.7 
   Jewish 0.9 1.9 
   Eastern or Greek Orthodox  0.7 0.5 
   Mormon 0.5 1.6 
Sources: Pew Research Center and U.S. Census Bureau  
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Poststudy diagnostics using Chi-squared and ANOVA as appropriate for categorical and 
numerical data indicate the experimental conditions were balanced with respect to 
education, gender, race, partisanship, and age.   
Treatments:  
All participants were assigned to read a total of three articles and all began the 
experiment by reading two warm up articles: one was an article about health and 
nutrition in the world and the second was about a police officer saving a dog in the city of 
Fort Worth, Texas.  The final story, immediately following the warm up articles was one 
of the three treatment articles. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
treatments groups: positive frame story, negative framed story, and control article. The 
first and second treatment articles (positive and negative frame articles) had considerable 
overlap in regard to presenting background information about the building of an Islamic 
Center and mosque in the city of Temecula, California. But the treatments varied 
tremendously in the alternative framing of the overall opinion of community members 
and leaders. The alternative framing was consistent and similar to the framing found in 
articles I read while conducting the content analysis (described in depth in chapter 3).  
The positive frame emphasized that the community members, religious leaders, and 
politicians expressed overwhelming support for the right to build the center. The negative 
frame emphasized that the community members, religious leaders, and politicians 
expressed overwhelming concern and opposition to the building of the center. Besides the 
fear of increased traffic in the area, the largest concern was the center would be used to 
harbor Islamic extremism. The final treatment was a control article that discussed how 
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Mark Zuckerberg was building a new home in Hawaii. Table 4.2 provides a summary of 
the stories’ content. Appendix A contains the full text articles as presented to participants.   
Table 4.2: Content of Building of Mosque Story, Experiment I 
  
Table 4.2 Content of Building of 
Mosque Story, Experiment I   
  Positive Frame Negative Frame  
      
Theme 
Community members, religious leaders, and 
politicians have expressed support for the 
right to build an Islamic Center. Muslims 
have made great contributions to the 
community. Center would help the local 
economy.  
Community members, religious 
leaders, and politicians have 
expressed great concern about the 
Islamic Center. Fear of creating a 
haven for Islamic extremists. 
Increased traffic and noise to the 
area.  
      
Quotes  
"we remember when there were protests in 
this country against Synagogues being build. 
I believe that Muslims have the same right 
to practice their religion as anyone else in 
this country. That includes the right to build 
a place of worship and a community center 
on private property"  
"we have a constitutional right to 
freedom of religion… But Islam is 
more than a religion. It is an ideology 
to enforce Sharia Law (Islamic 
jurisprudence) in America, and 
Sharia las is in direct contrast to the 
American Constitution"  
      
Images  
Women holding sign that states "Temecula 
supports freedom of religion"  
Several protesters holding signs that 
expressed opposition to the Islamic 
Center. Signs state, "No Sharia Law" 
"Muslims danced with joy on 9/11 
Never Forget" "No rights for 
Women- No rights for Mosques"   
   
Immediately following the reading of the articles, respondent answered questions 
corresponding to the treatment group they received. This was to ensure that respondents 
were paying attention and actually reading the articles. The manipulation check 
confirmed that the vast majority (87%) of respondents paid attention to the articles and 
answered the questions correctly. To conclude the study respondents answered questions 
concerning their perceived personal threat and questions measuring their contact with 
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Muslims, KKK members and LGBT individuals. These items will be discussed in more 
depth in the next chapter where the analysis of the findings will be reported.  
Tolerance Measures: 
  Immediately following the reading of articles and the answering of screening 
questions participants answered a battery of questions concerning their tolerance of 
Muslims. It is imperative to specify how tolerance was measured in my study. As 
discussed earlier in this dissertation, I utilize the definition of tolerance developed by 
Bernard Crick (1973) and Sullivan et al. (1981).  Tolerance implies willingness and ability 
to put up with opinions and/or behaviors that one opposes or rejects by extending 
liberties and protections to these “disliked” groups (Sullivan et al. 1981). When we say 
that one tolerates an individual we certainly do not mean that one likes or approves of 
them but merely that, in spite of their dislike, and opposition, one shall endure them 
and/or their action (Allport, 1979). Tolerating someone implies the willingness to permit 
the expression of other people’s ideas or interests. Tolerant individuals do not restrict 
ideas that challenge their own opinions. My dependent variable assesses respondent’s 
attitudes towards allowing individuals to access liberties and protections. Respondents 
answered a number of questions measuring their tolerance toward Muslims (See table 4.3 
for the list of questions). These questions correspond with Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 
(1982) definition of tolerance: The willingness and ability to put up with opinions and/or 
behaviors that one opposes or rejects. The degree of tolerance or intolerance was assessed 
on 6-point scale of: strongly approve, approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, 
disapprove, and strongly disapprove. My experiment also asked respondents to answer 
68 
 
my tolerance battery questions about other groups besides Muslims. This was done to 
ensure that respondents are not aware of the hypotheses and expectations that exposure 
to media effects tolerance of Muslims. These groups included tolerance towards LGBT 
individuals and KKK members. 
Table 4.3 Tolerance Battery Questions:  
 
A. Do you approve or disapprove allowing ______________ to build 
a center and in the city of  Temecula? 
B. Do you approve or disapprove allowing _________ to build a 
center in your community? 
C. Do you approve or disapprove allowing _________ to make a 
public speech in your city? 
D. Do you approve or disapprove of having _________ phone 
conversations recorded by the government?  
E. Do you approve or disapprove allowing of _________ holding 
public rallies in your city? 
F. Should _______ be subject to more searchers in airports or public 
buildings? 
 
Importantly, results from an overall tolerance battery (all questions in table 4.3) 
show excellent agreement (Cronbach’s 𝛼 = 0.87).  In the analysis below, I utilize support 
for the construction of a mosque in the city of Temecula and one’s own community as 
mosque construction is the subject of the treatment articles.  To test if the overall 
tolerance battery assesses a similar latent variable related to tolerance, I performed 
principal components factor analysis.  The result was a single factor with a minimum 
value of -2.79 and a maximum of 1.10. The distribution is skewed with a tail out towards 
more negative values, a mean of 0, median of 0.19, and a standard deviation of 0.96.   In 
the analysis below, I use this tolerance construct as an additional, more general, measure 
of tolerance. 
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Experiment II:  
 
Experiment II overlaps tremendously with most of the features of experiment I, but varies 
by increasing the presentation of more positive and negative frames. Besides addressing 
H1 and H2, experiment II is especially focused on addressing one my main arguments 
that frequency of exposure to positive and negative news matters. While previous studies 
have identified important determinants of tolerance, I argue that we are still not clear to 
what extent frequency of exposure to the media affects tolerance and whether or not 
interactions with individuals may mitigate the effect. My research project is centered on 
understanding the effect of frequency of exposure to both negative and positive tone of 
coverage.  
Experiment II was designed to assess the effects of frequency and maintain the 
treatments from experiment I. This is important because this experiment design enables 
me not only to examine differences between high frequency (two articles) exposure to 
media coverage and control, but also to examine differences between low frequency (1 
article) and high frequency treatments (two articles).  
In my last study I used a sample of undergraduates, which inevitably may raise questions 
about the representativeness of my findings. To ensure that the findings I observed in my 
last experiment was not a product of using a student sample, I conducted a second 
experiment using a national sample from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The goal 
was to be able to replicate the results from my first Experiment. My second experiment 
was launched on Amazon Mechanical Turk on September 28th, 2017 and ended 
October 30th, 2017. I paid respondents $0.50 for participating in the study from a 
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research fellowship I received from University of California Riverside and ended up with 
2423 participants. Table 4.4 provides a summary of some of the sample demographic 
characteristics of experiment II. As is typical for MTurk studies, my sample slightly 
overrepresents American females and Democrats (Berinksky et al., 2011). Poststudy 
diagnostics using Chi-squared and ANOVA as appropriate for categorical and numerical 
data indicate the experimental conditions were balanced with respect to education, 
gender, race, partisanship, and age.  
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Table 4.4 Sample Characteristics for Experiment II 
 Experiment II National Sample 
Sample Size  2423   
Sex      
    Female  58.1 50.8 
    Male  41.9 49.2 
Race/ethnicity      
    White 76.4 76.9 
    Black  7.2 13.3 
    Hispanic  6.2 17.8 
    Asian  5.9 5.7 
    Other   1.9 7 
    Native American  0.5 0.5 
    Middle Eastern  0.3 0.5 
 Party Identification      
    Democrat  38.6 28 
    Independent  28.4 41 
    Republican  24 25 
    Something else  5.4 1 
    Don't know/Refused  3.3 1 
Political ideology      
    Somewhat liberal  28.3   
    Moderate  26.2   
    Somewhat conservative 20.1   
    Very liberal  16.7   
    Very conservative  6.9   
Religion        
Protestant  19.4 14.7 
Roman Catholic  16.1 20.8 
Nothing in particular  15.1 15.8 
Atheist  12.6 3.1 
Agnostic  12.2 4 
Evangelical Christian  8.6 25.4 
Something else  7.2 0.3 
Jewish 2.2 1.9 
Mormon 1 1.6 
Muslim  0.8 0.9 
Hindu  0.8 0.7 
Eastern or Greek Orthodox 0.5 0.5 
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Treatments: 
Since the second experiment is focused on understanding how frequency of 
exposure to positive and negative news stories affects tolerance, I increased the 
respondent’s exposure to negatively and positively framed stories.  Just like the first 
experiment I constructed two new artificial but very realistic negatively and positively 
framed articles that were very similar to the news articles I collected for my content 
analysis (discussed in depth in chapter 3). I then embed the stories into an electric 
newspaper style format to make them as realistic as possible (See Appendix A for full text 
articles as presented to respondents). Constructing my own articles allows for “greater 
control over the information that varied across framing conditions, minimizing the 
change that idiosyncratic features of the news stories confounded with the frames were 
responsible for the observed effects” (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley; 1997, pg. 575). Table 
4.5 lists all five treatment groups that participants were randomly assigned to. 
Table 4.5 Treatment Exposure Options   
Treatment  Framing of Story  
1 Positive Mosque story  
2 Negative Mosque story  
3 Ice Cream Museum Control story  
4 1 Positive Mosque Story & 1 Positive Muslims Story  
5 1 Negative Mosque Story & 1 Negative Muslims Story  
 
The two new positive and negative articles that I constructed shared the similarity 
of discussing the same topic, which were stories involving Muslims in America. Overall 
the stories varied in how they presented Muslims either in an overwhelmingly positive or 
negative frame. The positive frame article emphasized many positive qualities found in 
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American Muslims for example, how Muslims in America are better educated than most 
Americans. The negative frame emphasized a story about a Muslim couple who 
committed a horrific shooting at a work place killing 14 people. I also included a new 
control article that discussed the opening of an Ice Cream Museum in Los Angeles. Table 
4.6 provides a summary of the news stories content (see Appendix A for full articles).  
Table 4.6: Content of News Stories About Muslim Americans, Experiment II.  
  Positive Frame Negative Frame  
Title  
"The Truth about Muslims in 
America" 
“Muslim Newlyweds slaughter 
co-workers who threw them a 
baby shower” 
Quotes  
"Muslims have been crucial in helping 
law enforcement find terror suspects in 
the United States. Many have served in 
the military protecting the country 
against terrorists. And in many ways, 
they're a lot like other everyday 
Americans".   
Authorities have said that the 
couple were inspired by 
Islamic extremism, calling it 
the deadliest such attack on 
US soil since Sept. 11, 2001. 
“This was not a casual 
workplace argument,” one law 
enforcement source told The 
Post. “It’s a well-planned and 
thought-out attack.”  
Images  
Image of woman smiling wearing a 
hijab (headscarf) with the print of 
United States flag.  
Image of people in distress and 
fear over what had occurred 
on the site of the attack. A 
man whose shirt shows blood 
stains is being hugged by 
women who is crying.   
 
After reading the articles participants answered screening questions to ensure they 
did not skip over the articles and actually read them. The manipulation check confirmed 
that the vast majority (89%) of respondents paid attention to the articles and answered the 
questions correctly. Immediately following the reading of articles and the answering of 
screening questions participants answered a battery of questions concerning their 
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tolerance of Muslims, KKK members, and LGBT individuals just like in experiment, as 
well as perceived personal threat. Similar to experiment I, in the analysis below, I utilize 
support for the construction of a mosque in the city of Temecula, in one’s own 
community, and a factor constructed from the overall tolerance battery1.  
Experiment III: 
Experiment III overlaps tremendously with most of the features of experiment I 
but varies in one important way, which is the method of which contact is measured in this 
experiment. In my first two experiments, I use the common approach of self-reported 
measure of contact, which may limit the ability to draw causal inferences since contact is 
not randomly assigned. In my third experiment, I developed a novel method of 
measuring contact in a laboratory setting, by recruiting female research assistants who 
wore the hijab (Muslim Women Head Covering) or not while running the experiments. 
Experiment III was specifically designed to assess the effect of contact where contact is 
randomly assigned. However, in this chapter, I use experiment III treatment groups 
without contact to further test H1.  
In experiment III, respondents were exposed to one of three treatments groups: 
one positively framed article, two negatively framed articles, or a control article. (See 
table 4.7) These treatment groups were designs based on the findings from experiments I 
and II, as well as after considerable literature review and conducting a through content 
analysis of a large set of news articles (from Chapter 3). As will become clear later, I find 
 
1 The overall tolerance battery showed good agreement (alpha = 0.9).  To assess tolerance as a latent 
variable, I performed principal components factor analysis.  The result was a single factor with a minimum 
value of -2.25 and a maximum of 1.20. The distribution is skewed with a tail out towards more negative 
values, a mean of 0, median of 0.17, and a standard deviation of 0.96.    
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that a single negative story does not create a significant difference with respect to the 
control, likely as a result of the overwhelmingly negative coverage in the broader 
environment. Therefore, in order to assess the effects of contact in the presence of 
negative news I used the treatment from experiment II, which used 2 negative articles. I 
also observed in experiment I and II significant differences with respect to the control 
upon exposure to 1 positive new story. I therefore utilized a single positive story in the 
positive treatment group. I used the same articles that were used in experiments I and II.  
Table 4.7 Treatment Options in Experiment III 
 
Treatment  Framing of Story  
1 1 Positive Mosque story  
2 1 Negative Mosque Story & 1 Negative Muslims Story 
3 Ice Cream Museum Control story  
 
My third experiment was launched on November 13th, 2017 and ended on 
December 13th, 2017 at the University of California Riverside School of Business 
Behavioral Research Laboratory and included 568 undergraduate student participants. 
Students were recruited from political sciences courses and received extra credit in 
exchange for participating in the study in person at the Business Behavioral Research 
Laboratory or reading an assigned article about experimental methods in political 
science. The majority of students selected to participate in the experiment instead of 
reading the article. Table 4.8 provides a summary of the demographic and political 
characteristics of my sample and compares it to the national data from the United States 
Census Bureau and the Pew Research Center. The data shows that my sample varies 
substantially on important demographic and political variables. As mentioned earlier in 
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my discussion of experiment I, I expect it to be more difficult to find support for my 
hypotheses using college students and I believe it is reasonable to assume that my sample 
may provide for a more rigid test of the extent to which the media may affect tolerance. 
Poststudy diagnostics using Chi-squared and ANOVA as appropriate for 
categorical and numerical data indicate the experimental conditions were balanced with 
respect to education, gender, race, partisanship, and age.  
As in the previous experiments, immediately following the reading of articles and 
the answering of screening questions participants answered a battery of questions 
concerning their tolerance of Muslims.  In the analysis below, I utilize support for the 
construction of a mosque in the city of Temecula and in one’s own community, in 
addition to a tolerance factor constructed using principal components factor analysis2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 The overall tolerance battery showed good agreement (alpha = 0.87).  To assess tolerance as a latent 
variable, I performed principal components factor analysis.  The result was a single factor with a minimum 
value of -2.99 and a maximum of 1.06. The distribution is skewed with a tail out towards more negative 
values, a mean of 0, median of 0.19, and a standard deviation of 0.96.    
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Table 4.8 Sample Characteristics for Experiment III 
  Experiment III National Sample  
Sample Size  562   
Sex      
    Female  60.4 50.8 
    Male  39.6 49.2 
Race/ethnicity      
    Hispanic  46.2 17.8 
    Asian  25.9 5.7 
    White 10.5 76.9 
    Other   6.7 7 
    Black  5.1 13.3 
    Middle Eastern  4.9 0.5 
    Native American  0.3 0.5 
Political ideology      
    Somewhat liberal  32.7   
    Moderate  28.6   
    Very liberal  22.9   
    Somewhat conservative 10.3   
    Very conservative  2.8   
 Party Identification      
    Democrat  62.6 28 
    Independent  14.2 41 
    Something else  8.1 1 
    Don't know/Refused  6.2 1 
    Republican  5.3 25 
Religion        
Roman Catholic  31.3 20.8 
Nothing in particular  19.6 15.8 
Evangelical Christian  9.2 25.4 
Agnostic  6.9 4 
Something else  6.4 0.3 
Atheist  6.2 3.1 
Muslim  4.6 0.9 
Protestant  4.4 14.7 
Eastern or Greek Orthodox 1.4 0.5 
Hindu  1.2 0.7 
Jewish 1.1 1.9 
Mormon 0.4 1.6 
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Results:  
H1: Exposure to negative media coverage decreases tolerance of Muslims. 
There is considerable support for the idea that negative news exposure adversely 
affects individuals’ opinions and tolerance of groups (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley; 1997; 
Kepplinger et al. 1989; Shaw, 1999; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Kahaneman, Slovic, & 
Tversky, 1982; Lau and Rover; 2009; Marcus, Neuman, & Makuen, 2000; Mutz, 1998; 
Schul & Schiff, 1993; Soroka, 2006; Soroka and McAdams, 2015; Skitka, Bauman, and 
Mullen, 2004). Across all three of my experiments, I only find support for this idea in 
experiment I, when respondents are asked whether they approve of allowing Muslims to 
hold public rallies in their city (higher values on a 6-point scale indicating more tolerance, 
when comparing the mean). I found that in the negative treatment individuals were less 
tolerant with a mean tolerance score of 4.44 as compared to 4.61 for the control group. 
This difference is statistically significant according to a difference in mean test (p=0.10). 
It was initially surprising that the negative treatment did not overall adversely affect 
tolerance of Muslims. However, if we recall from the literature discussed in chapter 2, 
many scholars have demonstrated that Muslims have overwhelmingly been portrayed 
negatively by the media. Many contemporary scholars have found that the media has 
both before and after the tragic events of September 11, 2001 characterized and 
demonized Muslims negatively (Gershkoff and Kushner, 2005; Reese, 2007; Powell and 
Abadi, 2003, Powell, 2011; Lajevardi, 2017, Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018). The media 
overwhelmingly has focused on a narrative of us versus them, or the United States versus 
Islam. This allowed for a consistent climate of fear of terrorism that was often linked to 
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Muslims (Reese, 2007). Even prior to September 11, U.S media reporting on Muslims 
and Islam was connected to oil, Iraq, Afghanistan and Terrorism. This reporting all 
involved exposing Americans to stories concerning control of oil, war, and terrorism 
(Said, 1978). The majority of Muslim Americans have also expressed and recognized that 
media reporting of Muslims and Islam has been negative. My own content analysis that I 
conducted and discussed in chapter 3 also supports these findings. Recall that my content 
analysis looked at stories that discussed the building of mosque in the city of Temecula 
and overall the content analysis revealed that the majority (about 70%) of the 42 articles 
overwhelmingly reported on the building of the Mosque in Temecula negatively and only 
about 10% were positive, and about 20% were conflicting (including both positive and 
negative information).  
From this information we can conclude that my experiments took place in an 
environment where news coverage of Muslims is overwhelmingly negative. It is not 
surprising therefore that a single negative article in this context does not create a 
significant response as the baseline is already negative. Importantly, as I will discuss 
below, we can explore this further by turning to the studies that included exposure to 
multiple negative stories.  
H2: Exposure to positive media coverage increases tolerance of Muslims 
I find support for H2 across all three experiments. Recall that hypothesis 1 relates 
to increases in tolerance of Muslims corresponding to exposure to positively toned media 
coverage and my key assumption is that any amount of media exposure matters in 
effecting tolerance of groups. I first test whether positive coverage increases support for 
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the construction of the Temecula mosque, with higher values on a 6-point scale 
indicating more tolerance. I find that in the positive treatment individuals express greater 
tolerance with a mean tolerance score of 5.03 as compared to 4.86 for the control group. 
This difference is statistically significant according to a difference in means test (p=0.05).  
I also observed greater increases in support for the Temecula Mosque between positive 
and control treatments in experiments II and III.  In experiment II, the positive treatment 
received a mean score of 4.91 as compared to 4.32 for the control group.  This difference 
is statistically significant according to a difference in means test (p=0.00). In experiment 
III, the positive treatment yields a mean tolerance score of 5.38 versus 4.83 for the 
control. This difference was also statistically significant (p=0.00). Together, this supports 
the idea that in the context of more positively toned coverage, support for construction of 
the Temecula mosque is increased.   
 Turning to support for construction of a Mosque in a respondents’ own 
community, I again find considerable, repeated support in experiments II and III.  In 
experiment II, the positive treatment received a mean tolerance score of 4.72 as 
compared to 4.28 for the control group. The difference in the means is highly significant 
at (p= 0.00). In experiment III, the same comparison yields 5.27 in the positive treatment 
vs. 4.69 in the control, and this difference is statistically significant (p=0.00). Therefore, 
these finding suggest that not only is support for construction of Temecula mosque 
increased (the subject of the positive article), but that tolerance towards construction of a 
mosque in one’s own community is also increased.  Interestingly, in experiment I, I find 
that positive media treatment (group mean = 4.95) led to a smaller increase in support for 
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construction of a mosque in one’s own community as compared to the control (group 
mean = 4.84).  This difference is significant, but only using a one tailed test (p=0.09, one 
tailed). I also note that in a secondary analysis of experiment I, which excludes 
participants who failed reading comprehension tests, I find a larger difference between 
the positive (group mean = 5.00) and control (group mean = 4.86), which is significant 
with a two tailed difference in means test (p=0.09, two tailed).  The different results 
observed between experiment I and experiments II and III may suggest that respondents 
are more willing to extend tolerance to Muslims in Temecula than in their own 
community. 
The results from my tolerance construct from experiments II and III also support 
H1. In experiment II, I find that the positive toned treatment results in increases in the 
mean tolerance factor score. The positive treatment received a mean value of 0.167 as 
compared to -0.11 in the control group, and the difference between the two mean scores 
is significant at (p= 0.00). I find similar support in experiment III, where the same 
comparison yields a mean of 0.29 for the positive treatment in comparison to -0.19 for 
the control treatment, and this difference is statistically significant (p=0.00). My tolerance 
construct captures the latent attitudes towards Muslims and is constructed from 
assessments of willingness to allow Muslims to not only construct a mosque, but also 
attitudes towards surveillance, public speech, and public rallies. Therefore, I conclude 
that the effects of positive toned coverage extend beyond the primary subject of the news 
story3.  It is important to note that results from my tolerance construct is a second area 
where I find differing results between experiment I and experiments II and III.   In 
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experiment I, the difference between positive (group mean = 0.05) and control (group 
mean = -0.01) treatments was not significant (p=0.40, two tailed).  It is also important to 
note a specific difference between experiment I and experiments II and III.  In 
experiment I, respondents were exposed to the treatment article (e.g. control, positive, or 
negative article) along with two warm-up articles, whereas in experiments II and III 
respondents were only exposed to the treatment article.  Although treatments were 
randomly assigned, previous scholarly work suggests that individuals have difficulty 
simultaneously processing a large number of ideas (Zaller, 1992).  Despite this null result, 
on the preponderance of evidence from experiments II and III provides support for H2.    
H3: Individuals more frequently exposed to negatively toned coverage will express 
increasing levels of intolerance  
 Now that the core assumption about news exposure has been tested above (H1 
and H2), I now turn to experiment II, which was specifically designed to assess whether 
frequency of exposure (positive and negative increased exposure) to news stories affects 
tolerance of groups (H3 and H4). To assess the effects of multiple exposure to news stories 
I compared the results between treatments where respondents are exposed to a single 
negative news story and a treatment where respondents are exposed to two negative news 
stories. Just like H1 and H2, for H3 I ask respondents if they support the construction of 
the Temecula mosque (higher values on a 6-point scale indicating more tolerance). I find 
that the mean response among individuals exposed to two negative stories (4.12) to be less 
than individuals exposed to 1 negative story (4.29). This difference is statistically 
significant according to a difference in means test (p=0.02). While there is no significant 
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difference between the single negative treatment and control group, two negative stories 
do create a statistically significant difference (p=0.00). Turning to support for construction 
of a Mosque in a respondents’ own community, I find similar support, that frequency of 
exposure to negative news stories increases intolerance. The mean response among 
individuals exposed to two negative stories (mean 4.11) is less than individuals exposed to 
1 negative story (mean 4.27). The difference in means is significant at (p= 0.04, two 
tailed). Importantly with respect to the control vs two negative treatment the difference in 
means is also significant (p=0.03). 
The results from my tolerance factor from experiment II also support H3.  In 
experiment II, I find that the two negative treatment results in decreases in the mean 
tolerance score. The two negative treatment received a mean value of -0.23 as compared 
to -0.11 for the single-story negative treatment. The difference in means is significant at 
(p= 0.01, two tailed). With respect to the control vs two negative treatment, I find a 
significant difference in means with the (p=0.01).   
It is important to note that similar to my findings in experiment I, a single 
negative article does not create a significant difference on the tolerance factor. But two 
negative articles do create a significant difference with a net decrease in tolerance with 
respect to both the control and the single negative article treatments. As explained earlier 
in my literature review and findings from my content analysis, this is likely a product of 
the overwhelmingly negative environment of reporting on Muslims. Overall, I find that 
the effect of more frequent exposure to negative news stories is significant, measurable 
and repeated across several tolerance measures, which overall supports my hypothesis 
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that individuals more frequently exposed to negatively toned coverage express increasing 
levels of intolerance.  
H4: Individuals more frequently exposed to positively toned coverage will express 
increasing levels of tolerance 
Experiment II also enables me to test my fourth hypothesis, where I argue that 
exposure to multiple positive news stories increases tolerance of groups. To assess the 
effects of exposure to multiple news stories I compared the results between treatments 
where respondents are exposed to a single positive news story and a treatment where 
respondents are exposed to two positive news stories. I find that mean support for 
building a mosque in Temecula among individuals exposed to two positive stories (5.02) is 
higher than individuals exposed to 1 positive story (4.91). This difference is statistically 
significant according to a difference in means test (p=0.07). Importantly, exposure to two 
positive stories also leads to a significant (p=0.00) increase as compared to the control 
(4.32).  
Turning to support for construction of a Mosque in a respondents’ own 
community, I find similar support, that frequency of exposure to positive news stories 
increases tolerance. The mean response among individuals exposed to two positive stories 
(mean 4.91) is greater than individuals exposed to 1 positive story (mean 4.72) and control 
(mean 4.28). These differences are statistically significant according to a difference in 
means test (p=0.01 and p=0.00 respectively). The results from my tolerance construct 
from experiment III supports H4. In experiment III, I find that the two positive treatment 
results in increases in the mean tolerance score. The two positive treatment received a 
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mean value of 3.87 as compared to 3.51 for the single-story positive treatment. The 
difference in means is significant at (p= 0.02, two tailed).  
My experiments reveal among the above tolerance measures that more frequent 
exposure to positive news stories yields increases in tolerance. Exposure to one news story 
creates a substantial increase in tolerance.  Exposure to two positive stories creates a 
subsequent, but smaller increase.  
Conclusion:  
The results from my three experiments substantiate my claim that media exposure 
matters and plays an integral role in affecting tolerance of groups. My present results 
show that not only does the type of exposure to news matter (positive or negative) but also 
the amount; and both can exert substantial influence on opinions of groups. My results 
from experiment II show that frequency of exposure is very important, as I demonstrate 
that increased exposure to negative news stories increases intolerance towards Muslims, 
and increased exposure to positive news stories correspondingly increases tolerance 
towards Muslims. The results from this chapter and the next lead me to the conclusion 
that we need to think of the factors that influence tolerance on a continuum. These 
factors (type of exposure, amount of exposure, and contact (explored in next chapter) 
interact with each other to create an overall effect on tolerance. In the following chapter, 
I demonstrate the effect of contact and interactions between contact and multiple news 
exposure. 
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Chapter 5: Intergroup Contact and Tolerance: How Mediated and Self 
Reported Contact Affects Tolerance in the Context of Media Exposure 
 
What effect does intergroup contract and media have on tolerance of groups?  
This question has received considerable attention among scholars who have argued that 
intergroup contact is one of the most effective strategies for improving intergroup 
relations (Allport, 1954, 1979; Amir, 1969; Cook, 1985; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and 
Tropp, 2006; Watson, 1947). Specifically, the inter-group contact hypothesis states that 
“Prejudice, unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual, may be 
reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority individuals in pursuit of 
common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional 
support (i.e. by law, custom or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that leads to 
the appropriation of common interests and common humanity between members of the 
two groups” (Allport, 1954, p. 281). While past studies on intergroup contact have 
advanced and validated our understanding of implications and outcomes that may be 
achieved from intergroup contact, we still do not fully understand how the media may 
play a role in influencing the effect of intergroup contact on tolerance towards Muslim 
Americans. Specifically, I am interested in understanding how both intergroup contact 
and media exposure influence individuals’ tolerance of American Muslims. The present 
study will look at the comparative effects of both non-mediated (self-reported) and 
mediated (contact stimulated in a laboratory setting) effects on tolerance.  
Scholars have argued and found that media representations of Muslims and Islam 
have been consistently negative, especially in the decade following the tragic events of 
September 11, 2001 (Lavevardi and Oskooii; 2018; Huntington 2004; Lewis 2002; 
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Panagopoulos 2006; Pipes 2003; Saleem et al. 2015; Ahmed and Matthes, 2016; Powell 
and Abadi, 2003; Reese, 2007;  Ibrahim, 2010; Powell, 2011; Shaheen, 2009; Ibrahim, 
2010; Kumar, 2010;). The media has set a consistent narrative of us versus them, or the 
United States versus Islam. Muslims and Islam have been framed as ‘terrorist’, ‘violent’, 
‘extremists’, ‘fundamentalist’, ‘aggressors’, ‘radicals’, and ‘fanatics’ (Mishra, 2007b; 
Trevino et al., 2010; Ibrahim, 2010; Kumar, 2010; Martin and Phenlan, 2002; (Saleem et 
al. 2017; AlSultany, 2012; Dill et al., 2005; Dixon & Williams, 2015; Nacos & Torres-
Reyna, 2007; Powell, 2011; Shaheen, 2009; Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & 
Vermeulen, 2009; Kalkan, Layman, & Uslaner, 2009; Nisbet et al., 2009; Saleem & 
Anderson, 2013). This has allowed for a consistent fear of terrorism that has been often 
linked to Muslims (Reese, 2007). Even prior to September 11th, U.S media reporting on 
Muslims and Islam was connected to oil, Iraq, Afghanistan and terrorism (Said, 1978). 
Some research has also suggested that many view Muslim Americans as foreign and 
disloyal (Selod, 2015).  
This pervasive negative rhetoric among the media raises an important question 
that my research seeks to understand: how does intergroup contact affect tolerance and 
how does it condition the effects of negative and positive media coverage?  We know that 
intergroup contact may lead to increases in tolerance and decreases in prejudice, but a 
failure to consider the relationship between media exposure and contact may lead to 
misleading conclusions about how each impacts tolerance. In this chapter, I test whether 
contact with Muslims increases tolerance, and whether it also mitigates the effect of 
negative media on tolerance and enhances the effect of positive media.  
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Intergroup Contact Theory:   
  Studies on intergroup contact began to gain momentum in the United States 
following the Second World War, but these early studies revealed confusing and 
contradicting trends. Some concluded that contact with members of an out-group would 
create positive relationships that could lead to “mutual understanding and regard” (Lett, 
1945, p.35). While others argued that contact can produce more prejudice and 
“suspicious, fear, resentment, disturbance, and at times open conflict” (Baker, 1934, p. 
120). With two opposing conclusions at the forefront, researchers were compelled to 
complete more rigorous studies involving field work and laboratory experiments to better 
understand intergroup contact.  
  Scholars have since argued that intergroup contact is often effective in improving 
intergroup relations. F. Tredwell Smith conducted a prominent study in 1943, in which 
white Columbia University students had a series of intellectual contacts with Black leaders 
in Harlem. The author found that the students who had this interaction demonstrated 
significant improvements in their attitudes towards African Americans, which was not the 
case for students who did not experience interracial contact. Later, Deutsch and Collins 
(1951) conducted a large field experiment interviewing White housewives across different 
public housing projects. Two housing projects in Newark had Black and White residents 
separated while two other housing projects in New York City desegregated apartment 
assignment. The authors concluded that White women in the desegregated apartments 
had more positive contact with their Black neighbors, which in turn lead to more positive 
opinions and support for interracial housing. Many scholars have further extended and 
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repeated these findings, demonstrating interracial contact in public housing can lead to 
positive feelings for both Whites and Blacks (Wilner, Walkley, & Cook, 1952; Works, 
1961). 
  One of the most influential studies on contact is Gordon Allport (1954) who 
formulated what is known today as contact theory in his book The Nature of Prejudice. He 
argued through empirically grounded analysis, as people increase interaction with other 
groups, prejudice decreases (1954/1979). Specifically, Allport identified several 
prerequisite conditions for group contact to successfully reduce intergroup conflict. These 
include: 1) equal status 2) Intergroup cooperation 3) Common goals; and 4) Support of 
authorities, law, or customs. Many scholars have supported and validated Allport’s 
formulation (Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006) and have expanded these 
studies to include a variety of groups including individuals of various age groups, disabled 
people, homosexuals, and others.  
Several additional factors have been identified in the literature as critical 
conditions for successful and optimal intergroup contact. These have included common 
language, voluntary contact, regular and frequent contact, balanced ratio of in-group to 
out-group members, a prosperous economy, and low levels of anxiety (Dixon et al. 2005). 
Some research suggests that interpersonal contact succeeds best and leads to positive 
relationships when individuals learn to appreciate shared values and interests. According 
to Allport (1954) and Pettigrew (1998) this process occurs in three stages.  First, by turning 
away from a focus on group differences, which allows for friendships to develop while fear 
of the other declines. Second, by appreciation of group differences, which leads to 
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improved attitudes. Finally, through development of a shared identity that leads to a 
significant reduction in prejudice views.  
We learn that extended intergroup contact is more effective at reducing prejudice 
than short term contact because of increased opportunity to create friendships. Pettigrew 
(1997) examined the responses of over 3800 majority group members in probability 
samples from France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and West Germany, and found that 
people with out-group friends had significantly lower levels of bias towards the group and 
that the development of intergroup friendship played a critical role in the way that 
contact reduced bias. These friendships create trust that are rooted in a personalized form 
of communication, which in turn “reduces anxiety and discomfort.... [while] 
simultaneously, these processes provide an opportunity to disconfirm negative stereotypes 
of disliked out-groups, and thereby break down the monolithic perception of the out-
group as a homogenous unit” (Miller; 2002, p. 397) 
Scholars have examined the effect of group contact on tolerance. The inter-group 
contact hypothesis states “interaction between individuals belonging to different groups 
will influence the attitudes and behavior between members of these different groups” 
(Stein et al. 2000). Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of 203 studies 
on intergroup contact as an influence on varied measures of prejudice. They found that 
about 94 percent of the studies had an inverse relationship. Specifically, they argued that 
successful contact with members of one out-group could extend to greater tolerance and 
willingness to interact with other out-groups. 
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Studies have also found that contact at an early age is very effective in creating 
long lasting openness and diverse racial and ethnic friendships. For example, children 
who grow up in a more racially diverse area and in a multi-racial educational setting are 
more likely to have and form friendship from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds when 
they are older (Emerson, Kimbro, & Yancy, 2002).   
Media and Intergroup Contact  
  While the intersection of intergroup contact theory and media effects has not been 
extensively studied, scholars have found that mass media plays a role in influencing 
opinions of other groups. Several studies have demonstrated that people form their views 
about different social groups based on what they hear, read, and or see from all types of 
media sources (Fujioka, 1999; Tan et al., 1997; Schiappa et al., 2005; Ortiz & Harwood, 
2007). For example, as early as 1956, psychologists Horton and Wohl argued that mass 
media messages could create for the public the illusion of face-to-face contact with the 
characters presented in the media. Others have found that individuals who depend 
heavily on the media as a source of information are likely to hold worldviews that are 
similar to the media’s viewpoint (Ball-Rokeach, 1976). This has been known as media 
dependency theory.  
  In the 1990’s several research projects began to expand our understanding of the 
relationship between intergroup contact and media consumption. The majority of studies 
involving contact and media effects have focused on how the mass media has unfairly and 
negatively portrayed many minority groups, and how this in turn has created negative 
views and stereotypes about them.  These studies have been referred to as media 
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stereotype research.  
Much of the research on media exposure and group contact has focused on the 
negative consequences of media consumption, since historically minorities, racial and, 
ethnic outgroups have been overwhelmingly portrayed in a negative light by media (Hall, 
2003). For example, African Americans have been regularly depicted as law breaking, 
unmotivated, and clownish (Bogle, 2001; Dixon & Linz, 2000; Entman, 1990; Stroman, 
Merritt, & Matabane, 1989). Specific wording used by media, such as “welfare queens” 
and “Inner-city residents, has also reinforced the negative stereotypes of African 
Americans as being lazy, disruptive, and inferior, “bad minorities” (Feagin, 2006). Other 
studies have revealed a strong link between exposure to mass media and negative views 
towards African Americans (Dixon & Azocar, 2007; Ford, 1997; Gilliam & Iyengar, 
2000). One study conducted by Armstrong et al. (1992) argued that those with higher 
exposure to news had a more negative view towards African Americans socioeconomic 
status. Another study with similar results found that exposure to news programs made 
people view African Americans as more dangerous and violent (Dixon, 2008).  
 Many important theories and processes have emerged over the years to help 
better explain the relationship between media consumption and intergroup contact. One 
of these processes includes what Fujioka (1999) calls “vicarious contact”, which is the idea 
of intergroup contact experienced through media exposure.  The study finds that that 
television messages had a significant impact on viewers’ perceptions when firsthand 
information was lacking. Specifically, Fujioka found that vicarious contact with African 
Americans was more significant with White American students than it was for Japanese 
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international students.  I expect that in the case of Muslims, contact will provide firsthand 
information, thereby leading to moderation of negative media.  Another process of 
intergroup contact introduced by Schiappa, Gregg and Hewes (2005) is known as 
“prosocial contact”. The authors argued that when audience members form a friendship-
like relationship with an out-group member via a character(s) in the media, this increases 
the audiences understanding of the outgroup and further improves their attitudes towards 
the entire outgroup. A few years later a similar conclusion was made by Ortiz and 
Harwood (2007) when they introduced what they called “mediated intergroup contact”. 
In this relationship audience members observe an in-group member character who has a 
positive relationship with an outgroup member. This observation in turn allows the 
individual to also possess a more positive view of the outgroup.  I expect direct, positive 
contact to operate in a similar manner, thereby enhancing the effects of positive media.  
 In chapter 2, I describe the figure ground and cost orientation hypotheses as 
mechanisms whereby negative media leads to decrease in tolerance.  In the figure ground 
hypothesis, negative media about outgroups juxtaposes against the idea that people are 
“basically good”.  I expect that this effect is moderated by contact with a Muslim, as a 
positive contact experience provides direct firsthand evidence that Muslims are “basically 
good”.  Recall that the cost orientation hypothesis relates to perceived risk.  Here again, I 
expect that positive contact will moderate perceptions of risk thereby reducing the effects 
of negative media. 
 In chapter 2, I also describe the cognitive weighting and learning models whereby 
positive media increases tolerance by capturing attention and providing new information.  
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I expect that positive contact as a first-hand experience will capture attention even more 
so than media alone, leading to an enhancement of media effects and increases in 
tolerance.  Similarly, I expect that contact will provide new information, especially 
emotional information leading to reduced anxiety, thereby enhancing the effects of 
positive media. 
In the sections below, I test my expectations related to intergroup contact and its 
interaction with both positive and negative media: 
H5: Contact with a member of an out-group increases tolerant attitudes  
H6: Contact with a member of an out-group mitigates decreases in tolerance caused by 
negative media exposure. 
H7: Contact with a member of an out-group interacts with positive media exposure to 
enhance tolerance.  
Methods: 
In chapter 4, I fully detail 3 experiments used to test my hypotheses.  In this chapter, I 
focus on experiments II and III to study the effects of contact on tolerance of Muslims.  In 
the analysis below, I use Experiment II to assess the relationship between contact and 
tolerance in the context of 5 types of media exposure.  Experiment II was specifically 
designed to assess the effects of media exposure frequency, and comprised treatments 
exposing respondents to one or two, positive or negative news articles about proposed 
construction of a Mosque in Temecula, CA.  Importantly, experiment II employs a large 
national sample and provides a good means to assess the relationship between contact 
and tolerance in the context of 5 types of media exposure (i.e. control, one positive, two 
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positive, one negative, and two negative articles).  In experiment II, I use a self-reported 
measure of contact, in which all respondents were asked about the number, frequency, 
and quality of contact with Muslims, LGB individuals, as well as KKK members (see 
appendix B for detailed questions).  Importantly, results from my contact battery show 
reasonable agreement (Cronbach’s α=0.63).  To test if my contact battery assesses a 
similar latent variable related to contact, I performed principal components factor 
analysis.  The result was a single factor with a minimum value of -1.513 and a maximum 
of 1.953. The distribution is skewed with a tail out towards more negative values, a mean 
of 0.057, median of -0.040, and a standard deviation of 0.874.  In the analysis of 
experiment II below, I employ ordinary least squares (Table 5.1) analysis to relate this 
contact factor, dummy variables for each experiment treatment, and interaction terms 
(e.g. contact*one negative article) to support for construction of a mosque in the city of 
Temecula, one’s own community, and my tolerance factor (see chapter 4).  To assess the 
interactions between contact and experiment treatments, I calculate the average marginal 
effects (Table 5.2) of each treatment for low (15th percentile), average (mean), and high 
(85th percentile) levels of contact. 
The third experiment measures contact utilizing a novel and unique experimental 
design.  While self-reported measures of contact are common in the literature, it has 
limitations in the ability to draw casual inference since contact is not randomly assigned. 
For this reason, I conducted an experiment in which contact is measured and 
manipulated in a controlled laboratory setting where assignment to treatments can be 
administered and monitored. Specifically, experiment III was conducted in a laboratory 
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setting with female assistants who were randomly instructed to wear or not to wear a 
Muslim head-scarf (hijab) while helping study participants use a computer system.  
Comparing the control treatment with the hijab only treatment (i.e. control article vs. 
control article plus hijab) enables assessment of contact effects absent positive and 
negative media treatments. Together Experiments II and III provide a multi-faceted 
understanding to the study of contact as it relates to tolerance and media.  
Results 
H5: Contact with a member of an outgroup increases tolerant attitudes towards the 
outgroup. 
 I find considerable support for hypothesis 5 using both self-reported measures of, 
and randomly assigned contact.  Recall that hypothesis 5 associates an increase in 
tolerance with Muslim contact.  Table 5.1 shows the results of OLS models that relate 
tolerance of mosque construction in Temecula, one’s own community, and my overall 
tolerance factor (see chapter 4 for complete details on tolerance factor construction) to 
each treatment in experiment II, my contact factor, and interaction terms (e.g. 2 negative 
story treatment * contact factor).  In these models, the control treatment is the baseline 
and contact is a continuous factor ranging from -1.513 to 1.953.  The contact factor is 
significant in all three models (p<0.05, one tailed).  In the case of the Temecula mosque, 
the coefficient for contact is 0.202 (p=0.00, one-tailed), which implies that across the full 
scale of contact, support for Temecula Mosque construction is boosted by 0.700 units, 
which is significant on my six-point scale and comparable, but slightly larger than viewing 
2 positive articles (0.666, p=0.00, one tailed).  Turning to support for construction of a 
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Mosque in one’s own community, the result is similar although slightly more pronounced.  
In this case contact has a coefficient of 0.273, which across the full scale of my contact 
factor boosts tolerance by 0.946, or nearly one-full point on my six-point scale.  I find 
additional support for Hypothesis 5 in examining results with the tolerance factor 
(column 3 in Table 5.1).  In this case the coefficient for contact is again significant 0.190 
(p<0.00, one tailed) and causes a boost of 0.659 across the full scale of contact, which is 
considerable compared to the range of my tolerance construct (-2.25 to 1.20, or 3.45 units 
full scale).  
 Turning to experiment III where contact was randomly assigned more readily 
enables causal inference.  Recall that experiment III was conducted in a laboratory 
setting with female assistants who were randomly instructed to wear or not to wear a 
Muslim head-scarf (hijab) while helping study participants use a computer system.  
Comparing the control treatment with the hijab only treatment (i.e. control article vs. 
control article plus hijab) enables assessment of contact effects absent positive and 
negative media treatments.  Looking first at support for Temecula mosque construction, a 
difference in means test shows significantly increased tolerance (p=0.09, one-tailed) in the 
hijab treatment (5.03) vs. the control (4.83).  The results were similar and slightly larger 
when assessing support for a mosque in one’s own community.  In this case, the control 
group mean was 4.69 as compared to 4.98 for the hijab treatment.  This difference in 
means is significant, p = 0.04, one-tailed.  Finally, when comparing results of my overall 
tolerance construct, I again find a significant difference 0.25 units between the means 
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(p=0.04, one-tailed) which is considerable compared to the tolerance factor range (-2.25 
to 1.20, or 3.45 units full scale).   
 Overall, I find repeated, significant support of hypothesis 5 using both self-
reported and randomly assigned contact measures.  This results of randomly assigned 
contact are particularly interesting as they most readily enable inference of causal effects.  
Perhaps most striking is the consistency of the effect.  Recall from chapter 2, that contact 
may be more effective with repeated experiences, whereby relationships and friendships 
develop. In my experiment, contact involved assistance with a computer system in a 
single instance.  While this experience provides an opportunity for learning and initial 
anxiety reduction, it will be particularly interesting in future work to modulate the type of 
contact to create a detailed understanding of its effects.  For example, an experiment 
where participants have meaningful or multiple conversations with hijab or non-hijab 
wearing female assistants followed by an assessment of tolerance.  In the sections below, I 
again employ experiments II and III to assess interaction between contact, media 
exposure and their combined effect on tolerance judgements.  
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Table 5.1: Experiment II OLS regression results relating contact, experiment 
treatments, and interaction terms to tolerance measures. 
  Temecula Mosque Community Mosque Tolerance Factor 
  Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Coefficient (Standard 
Error) 
Coefficient (Standard 
Error) 
Intercept 5.018* (0.360) 4.853* (0.386) 0.294 (0.257) 
    
Contact 0.202* (0.054) 0.273* (0.0580) 0.190* (0.0386) 
    
2 Negative Articles -0.204* (0.0690) -0.171* (0.0740) -0.124* (0.0492) 
1 Negative Article -0.010 (0.0686) -0.0262 (0.0736) 0.0305 (0.0490) 
1 Positive Article 0.591* (0.0690) 0.463* (0.0740) 0.293* (0.0493) 
2 Positive Articles 0.666* (0.0692) 0.590* (0.0580) 0.355* (0.0494) 
    
Contact*2 Negative 
Articles 0.131* (0.0768) 0.143* (0.0823) 0.122* (0.0548) 
Contact*1 Negative 
Article 0.133* (0.0785) 0.118† (0.0841) 0.0645 (0.0561) 
Contact*1 Positive 
Article 0.118† (0.0779) 0.0901 (0.0835) 0.0784† (0.0556) 
Contact*2 Positive 
Articles 0.002 (0.0776) 0.0132 (0.0832) 0.0293 (0.0554) 
    
Highschool graduate -0.03 (0.396) 0.168 (0.385) 0.180 (0.257) 
Some College 0.056 (0.355) 0.306 (0.380) 0.256 (0.253) 
College Graduate 0.124 (0.354) 0.308 (0.379) 0.301 (0.252) 
Post Graduate 
Degree 0.207 (0.356) 0.374 (0.382) 0.344† (0.254) 
Liberal -0.357* (0.0647) -0.368* (0.0693) -0.321* (0.0463) 
Moderate -0.924* (0.0672) -1.019* (0.0721) -0.788* (0.0481) 
Somewhat 
Conservative -1.267* (0.0711) -1.482* (0.0762) -1.120* (0.0508) 
Conservative -1.727* (0.105) -1.859* (0.112) -1.401* (0.0749) 
* p<0.05 (one tailed), †p<0.10 (one tailed)    
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H6: Contact with a member of an out-group moderates decreases in tolerance caused by 
negative media exposure. 
 Turning to the specific relationships between contact and negative news exposure, 
my OLS models for experiment II include interactions between my contact factor and 
dummy variables (coded 0 or 1) for exposure to a single and two negative stories.  While 
interaction terms are often used to study moderating effects between variables (Kam and 
Franzese 2007), it is particularly instructive to consider the construction of my particular 
OLS models.  Importantly, experiment II comprised treatments with exposure to a single 
and two negative news articles.  Each of these treatments is coded as 0 or 1.  I employ 
marginal effects calculations (Kam and Franzese 2007) to determine the effect of each 
treatment in the context of low (15th percentile), average (mean), and high (85th percentile) 
contact (Table 5.2).  Looking first at support for Temecula Mosque construction (i.e. the 
topic of treatment articles), I find that contact has a significant (p<0.05, one tailed) 
moderating effect in the context of exposure to both single (coefficient = 0.133) and two 
(coefficient = 0.131) negative news stories (Table 5.1).  Inspection of the marginal effects 
(Table 5.2) reveals an interesting interplay between negative news exposure frequency 
and the moderating effects of contact.  Exposure to two negative articles creates 
significant decrease in tolerance for both low (-0.332, p<0.05, one-tailed) and average (-
0.196, p<0.05, one-tailed) contact.  In contrast, exposure to a single negative only creates 
a significant decrease in tolerance in the case of low contact (-0.139, p<0.1 one-tailed).  
Importantly, when contact is high, I find that exposure to either one or two negative 
articles does not lead to significant decreases in tolerance.  In the case of single negative 
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exposure, I find no treatment effect at average levels of contact as well.  Turning to 
support for mosque construction in one’s own community, I again find significant 
interaction terms between contact and single and two negative article treatments.  In the 
presence of two negative articles the coefficient is 0.143 (p<0.05, one tailed).  
Examination of the marginal effects shows a similar pattern to Temecula mosque support.  
Exposure to two negative articles leads to significant reduction in tolerance at both low (-
0.311, p<0.05 one-tailed) and average (-0.163, p<0.05 one-tailed) levels of contact, but 
not when contact is high. In the single negative article treatment the interaction 
coefficient is 0.118 (p<0.1, one-tailed).  Interestingly, inspection of the marginal effects 
shows that exposure to a single negative article leads to a net increase (0.149, p<0.1 one-
tailed) in tolerance.  This is a striking difference when compared to Temecula Mosque 
support.  Recall from chapter 2 that media may activate particular constructs in our 
memories (Ratcliff and McKoon, 1988).  Perhaps exposure to negative media leads to 
positive evaluations of mosque construction in one’s own community as a result of 
positive memories when contact is high. Finally, in the case of my tolerance factor, the 
interaction between contact and exposure to two negative stories was significant 
(coefficient = 0.122, p<0.05, on-tailed), while the interaction between contact and 
exposure to a single negative story was not.  Looking at the marginal effects reveals a 
similar pattern in the case of two negative articles, which leads to significant reductions in 
tolerance when contact is low (-0.243, p<0.05 one-tailed) or average (-0.118, p<0.05 one-
tailed), but not when contact is high.  Exposure to a single negative article does not lead 
to significant reduction in tolerance at low, average, or high contact as assessed by my 
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tolerance factor. Recall that my tolerance factor is constructed from a battery of 6 
questions, only two of which are specifically related to Mosque construction (i.e. the topic 
of treatment articles).   
 In experiment II, the moderating effects of contact related to increasing support 
for mosque construction in the context of negative news exposure was generally 
comparable across exposure to one and two negative articles on the Temecula Mosque.  
Importantly, the coefficients for interaction terms between contact and negative media 
treatments for all three models in Table 5.1 are positive, which suggests a moderating 
effect.  Examination of the marginal effects at low, average, and high contact also support 
my hypothesis that contact moderates the effect of negative news exposure.  Marginal 
effects analysis also suggests that negative media exerts larger effects when contact is low.  
In general, as contact increases, the effect of negative media exposure is reduced. 
Together, these findings support hypothesis 6.   
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Figure 5.1:  Experiment III.  A. Mean +/- standard error support for 
Temecula Mosque construction vs. treatment.  B. Mean +/- standard error 
support for construction of a mosque in your own community vs. treatment. 
C.  Mean +/- standard error tolerance factor scores vs. treatment. 
 
 
 Interestingly, when compared to the results of experiment II, I do not find direct 
support for hypothesis 6 in experiment III where contact was randomly assigned3.  What 
is particularly striking is that the positive effects of contact with respect to the control (see 
 
3 I do find a significant (p<0.1, one tailed) increase in tolerant judgments specifically related to support for 
the right of Muslims to hold public rallies between the two-negative article plus contact (4.623), and each 
the control (4.304) and two negative article (4.305) treatments. See Figure 5.1 in the chapter appendix B: 
Chapter 5.  
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discussion of hypothesis 5 above and Figure 5.1) group are diminished in the context of 
exposure to two negative articles.  Recall that support for the Temecula Mosque 
significantly (p=0.09 one tailed) increased in the control article plus contact (group mean 
= 5.03) condition as compared to the control (group mean = 4.83).  This effect is washed 
out in the two negative article plus contact treatment (group mean = 4.84), which is not 
statistically different from the control (p=0.4).  The difference between the contact and 
two negative articles plus contact groups is very nearly, but not quite significant (p=0.12, 
one-tailed).  Importantly, the difference between two negative articles (group mean = 
4.70) and two negative articles plus contact treatments (group mean = 4.84) is not 
statistically significant (p = 0.2 one-tailed). This pattern is repeated when looking at 
support for Mosque construction in one’s own community.  In this case, the significant 
(p=0.04, one-tailed) increase between the hijab (group mean = 4.98) and control (group 
mean = 4.69) is washed out in the two negative articles plus contact treatment (group 
mean = 4.73).  Here the difference between the contact and two-negative articles plus 
contact treatments is significant (p=0.06, one-tailed).  It is important to note here again, 
there is no significant difference (p = 0.28, one-tailed) between exposure to two negative 
articles (group mean = 4.63) and two negative articles plus contact (group mean = 4.73).  
In the case of my tolerance construct, I again find the two negative articles plus contact 
group (group mean = 0.0996) is not significantly (p=0.5) different from control (group 
mean = -0.191), again washing away the significant (p=0.04) difference between control 
and contact (group mean = 0.0604) groups.  Importantly, I again find no significant (p = 
0.14) difference between exposure to two negative articles (group mean = -0.25) and two 
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negative articles plus contact (group mean = -0.10). Together, these results suggest that 
exposure to two negative articles mitigates the positive effects of the type and amount of 
contact in the experiment III.  Recall from experiment II that the effects of exposure to 
two negative articles are only mitigated by contact when contact is high.  This result 
largely agrees with experiment III if we accept that assistance with a computer constitutes 
low or average contact. Together, the results of experiments II and III suggest a complex 
interplay between negative media exposure and contact.  Future experiments with 
multiple and different types of randomly assigned contact will be needed to fully map 
these interactions and their effects on tolerance.  
H7: Contact with a member of an out-group interacts with positive media exposure to 
enhance tolerance.  
 Turning to the relationship between contact and exposure to positive media, recall 
that the OLS models in Table 5.1 employ interaction terms between contact and dummy 
variables for single and two positive article treatments.  Looking first at support for 
Temecula Mosque construction, I find contact had a significant (p<0.10, one tailed) 
enhancing effect in the context of exposure to a single article (coefficient = 0.118), but not 
in the context of exposure to two positive articles.  Examination of the marginal effects 
(Table 5.2) suggests that the effects of exposure to a single positive article are increasingly 
enhanced by increased contact. The net effect of single positive article exposure is 0.477, 
0.598, and 0.714 units at low, average, and high contact respectively.  Each of these 
increases is significant (p<0.05, one-tailed) and considerable given my six-point scale. 
Importantly, the trend is itself significant (coefficient = 0.118, p<0.05), suggesting an 
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enhancing effect of contact in the context of exposure to a single positive article.  Turning 
to support for a mosque in one’s own community, I do not find enhancing effects for contact 
in either single or two positive article treatments.  Finally, looking at my tolerance factor, I 
again find a significant (p<0.10) enhancing effect (coefficient = 0.0784) in the single positive 
article treatment, but not in the context of two positive articles. Examination of the 
marginal effects in this case again show that the effects of positive media are 
correspondingly enhanced with increased contact.  Here the net effect of single positive 
exposure is an increase of 0.217, 0.298, and 0.374 at low, average, and high contact 
respectively.  Again, these increases are all significant (p<0.05, one-tailed) and the trend is 
also significant (coefficient = 0.0784, p<0.10, one-tailed). Together, these results show 
enhancing effects of contact in the case of single positive exposure and support my 
hypothesis.     
 Turning to Experiment III where contact was randomly assigned, I find a very 
consistent pattern.  Looking first at support for Temecula Mosque construction, a 
difference in means tests shows exposure to a single positive article plus contact (group 
mean = 5.442) leads to significantly (p < 0.05, one-tailed) greater tolerance than contact 
alone (group mean = 5.028).  Interestingly, there is no statistical difference between 
exposure to a single positive article (group mean = 5.381) and single positive plus contact 
group.  Each of these treatments is significant with respect to the control (group mean = 
4.830).  Interestingly, the relative increase in the positive article plus contact treatment 
compared to the contact only treatment is significant (p < 0.05), which suggests that contact 
effects are enhanced by positive media.   I find a similar result related to support for mosque 
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construction in one’s own community.  Exposure to a single positive article plus contact 
(group mean = 5.195) yielded significant (p < 0.05, one tailed) increases in tolerance with 
respect to both the control (group mean = 4.688) and control article plus contact treatments 
(group mean = 4.986).  Again, I found no significant difference between the single positive 
exposure (group mean = 5.267) and single positive article plus contact (group mean = 
5.195) treatments.  These results further support the idea that the effects of contact are 
enhanced by positive media.  Turning to my tolerance factor, a difference in means test 
show a significant (p<0.05, one-tailed) increase in tolerance upon exposure to a single 
positive story plus contact (group mean = 0.261) as compared to contact alone (group mean 
= 0.060) and no statistical difference between exposure to a single positive article (group 
mean = 0.295) and single positive article plus contact treatments.  Across support for 
mosque construction in Temecula, one’s own community, and my tolerance factor, I find 
a very consistent pattern showing no statistical difference between single positive story and 
single positive story plus contact groups.  Across the same three measures, I find an increase 
in tolerance when comparing the positive article plus contact treatments to both the control 
and control plus contact treatments.  Together, this suggests for the type and amount of 
contact in experiment III, positive media enhances the effects of contact, while contact does 
not enhance the effects of positive media.   
Conclusion 
 My mixed method approach contributes to our understanding of how the public 
develops opinions of groups. Specifically, tolerance reflects not only long-standing public 
characteristics, but can also be impacted by short term political forces such as news and 
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contact. Overall, I find strong support for H5: Contact with a member of an outgroup 
increases tolerance towards the outgroup.  However, I find mixed support for my 
expectations related to interactions between media and contact.  OLS models using self-
reported measures of contact in experiment II largely support my hypotheses and 
examination of marginal effects reveals a complex interplay between contact, the type of 
media exposure (negative or positive) and frequency of media exposure.  Experiment III 
revealed that the positive effects of contact may be washed out by exposure to two 
negative articles, or enhanced by exposure to a single positive one.  As discussed in 
chapter 2, the behavioral and cognitive effects of contact are enhanced with duration, 
repetition and increased emotional ties.  It will be instructive in future work to conduct 
new experiments similar to my experiment III, where the type, duration, and frequency 
of contact are modified to further develop the effects of contact and its interaction with 
media. 
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Table 5.2: Marginal effects of each Experiment II treatment at low, average, 
and high contact.    
    Temecula Mosque 
Community 
Mosque Tolerance Factor 
  Contact Marginal Effect  (Standard Error) 
Marginal Effect  
(Standard Error) 
Marginal Effect  
(Standard Error) 
2 Negative 
Articles 
low -0.332* (0.106) -0.311* (0.113) -0.243* (0.076) 
average -0.1964* (0.069) -0.163* (0.074) -0.118* (0.049) 
high -0.068 (0.101) -0.023 (0.108) -0.001 (0.072) 
     
1 Negative 
Article 
low -0.139† (0.106) -0.089 (0.113) -0.032 (0.076) 
average -0.002 (0.069) 0.033 (0.074) -0.034 (0.049) 
high 0.128 (0.103) 0.149† (0.111) -0.097 (0.074) 
     
1 Positive 
Article 
low 0.477* (0.107) 0.376* (0.115) 0.217* (0.076) 
average 0.598* (0.069) 0.469* (0.074) 0.298* (0.049) 
high 0.714* (0.101) 0.556* (0.109) 0.374* (0.072) 
     
2 Positive 
Articles 
low 0.664* (0.109) 0.578* (0.117) 0.327* (0.078) 
average 0.667* (0.099) 0.591* (0.074) 0.357* (0.049) 
high 0.669* (0.099) 0.604* (0.106) 0.386* (0.071) 
* p<0.05 (one tailed), †p<0.10 (one tailed)    
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 In my dissertation research I sought to address questions related to the effects of 
positive and negative media exposure on tolerance of groups, and to what extent contact 
can increase tolerance in the presence of media. Early scholars of media effects 
recognized the far-reaching power of the media to shape and mold mass attitudes 
(McCombs, 2014: Djerf-Pierre and Shenhata, 2017; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Iyengar 
& Kinder, 1987; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007: Krosnick and Kinder, 1990; Rogers and 
Dearing, 1996; Iyengar, 1991; Neuman, Just, and Crigler, 1992), while others have 
demonstrated contact as one of the most effective strategies for improving intergroup 
relations (Allport, 1954, 1979; Amir, 1969; Cook, 1985; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and 
Tropp, 2006; Watson, 1947). Little work has been conducted to understand the effects of 
frequency (i.e. exposure to multiple news stories) and its interaction with contact. I utilize 
tolerance of Muslim Americans as a case study to further our understanding of the effects 
of media--specifically the type (positive and negative) and amount (frequency)--contact, 
and the complex interplay between them. 
My research aims to better understand the driving forces of tolerance. This is 
crucially important because tolerance is a fundamental principle of democracy (Prothro 
and Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964). Political tolerance is crucial and any deviation in 
society from promoting tolerance is undesirable and threatens the very existence of 
democracy (Prothro-Grigg 1960, McClosky 1964; Lawrence 1976, Davis 1975). A key 
factor distinguishing democracies from alternative forms of government is the degree to 
which opposition is permitted. Although democratic regimes both allow and encourage 
111 
 
opposition, they sometimes face the challenge of balancing between opposing viewpoints 
and tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1989).  Citizens within democracies should 
not restrict the participation of their fellow citizens in the political system, even if their 
ideas challenge the view of the majority (Gibson 2010). Tolerance is essential because it 
protects citizens’ rights to political opposition and expression, thereby protecting them 
from the danger that members of a majority may violate the rights of the minority. Using 
Muslim Americans as a case study and a mixed methods approach, which relies on both 
quantitative (laboratory experiments) and qualitative (interviews) methods I demonstrated 
the role of media in affecting tolerance judgments and how contact may mitigate the 
effects of media in the case of negative coverage, while enhancing the effects of positive 
coverage. 
In chapter two of my dissertation I lay out my theoretical framework that leads to the 
development of my testable hypotheses. Previous work demonstrated that the way in 
which media reports and presents information plays a major role in the attitudes and 
opinions people develop (Hamill, Wilson, and Nisbett, 1980; Gamson et al. 1992, Iyengar 
1991, Nelson and Kinder 1996; Chong & Durckman, 2007; Neslon, Oxley, & Clawson, 
1997). I first considered negative media exposure, and why it can lead to intolerance. The 
figure ground hypothesis postulated by Lau in 1982 suggests that when negative media is 
presented in an environment where people are overall satisfied with their lives, it stands 
out since it is infrequent. A second important mechanism that helps explain the effects of 
negative media is the cost-orientation hypothesis, which explains that a desire to avoid costs 
is part of human nature (to ensure our survival). Exposure to negative media presents 
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ideas that can be construed as particularly costly, and as such would be expected to 
negatively affect individual opinions. Individuals also rely on heuristics to simply their 
judgments. In particular, negative media provides negative heuristics that individuals use 
to create mental shortcuts when forming opinions, which would be expected to negatively 
affect tolerance.  
Turning to the role that positive media has on shifting public opinion we look to 
cognitive weighting model, which states that “more attention is given to information that is 
regarded as unique or novel, which tends to be information that is more extreme (e.g., 
Fiske 1980)” (Soroka; 2006). This idea is also supported by the learning model, which holds 
that mass media messages influence individuals’ opinions by providing “new information” 
about an issue (Graber, 1994). The existing literature detailed in chapter 2 highlights the 
processes whereby positive media influences opinion formation, along with scholarly work 
demonstrating the effects of positive media in the context of other groups, which together 
lead me to expect that positive media coverage would increase tolerant judgments.  
A central aspect of my research argues that more frequent exposure to positive and 
negative news matters in shifting tolerance. Specifically, when the same or similar 
information is repeated, it leaves little room for competing points of view.  When 
information is frequently repeated, it becomes easily accessible and retrieved when 
making decisions (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley; 1997). For example, an individual 
repeatedly exposed to negative portrayals of Muslims would more likely have these 
negative ideas at the forefront of their conscious thought than someone who was exposed 
only to one. Additionally, in chapter 2, I highlight the mechanisms by which group 
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contact can affect tolerance judgments. Scholars have previously examined the effect of 
group contact on tolerance and many have argued that intergroup contact is one of 
psychology’s most effective strategies for improving intergroup relations (Allport, 1954, 
1979; Amir, 1969; Cook, 1985; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Watson, 
1947). Contact may lead to behavioral changes, which in turn lead to improved attitudes 
towards outgroups (Pettigrew 1998). Contact is also particularly effective in moderating 
negative emotions and increasing positive emotions associated with outgroups, which in 
turn improves attitudes (Pettigrew 1998; Reich & Purbhoo, 1975). 
After detailing the mechanisms of my theory in chapter 2, I turn to the qualitative 
dimension of my work in chapter 3, where I conduct a detailed content analysis of over 
40 articles related to construction of a Mosque and Islamic Center in the City of 
Temecula in 2010. My content analysis revealed that the majority of the articles were 
framed in a way that described the opposition of the building of the Islamic Center in a 
negative way.  Fear of extremist activity (86%), fear of Islam as a domestic threat (76%), 
and Islamization of America (57%) were particularly common themes. I later use these 
finding to develop my experimental treatment articles. Chapter 3 also includes results 
from my phone interviews with Temecula residents who expressed their opinions about 
the controversy surrounding the proposed construction of a Mosque in the city of 
Temecula in 2010. Analysis of my interviews provided initial support of my hypotheses 
that both media and contact are important factors influencing tolerance. Overall, the 
interviews in chapter 3 provided a framework to further understand the outcome of 
survey experiments that statistically assess the effects of media coverage and contact on 
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tolerance in chapter 4 and 5. In particular, the interview process enabled open ended 
questions, without an enumerated list to guide the response. Importantly, these interviews 
further supported my expectations as they relate to media and contact, which in turn 
enhanced our understanding of what contributes to tolerance judgments. 
In Chapter 4, I move on to begin my discussion on the quantitative dimension of my 
research.  I use results from three original experiments to better understand the 
relationship between media exposure and tolerance of groups. The results from my three 
experiments substantiate my claim that media exposure matters and plays an integral role 
in affecting tolerance of groups. My present results demonstrate that not only does the 
type of exposure to news matter (positive or negative), but also the amount; and both can 
exert substantial influence on our opinions of groups. For example, when respondents 
were exposed to one negative news story about Muslims in an environment where news 
coverage of Muslims is overwhelmingly negative, I observed that a negative treatment did 
not overall adversely affect tolerance of Muslims. However, when individuals were 
exposed to multiple negative news stories, I observed a significant decrease in tolerance. 
Overall, I found that the effect of more frequent exposure to negative news stories is 
significant, measurable and repeated across several tolerance measures, which together 
supported my hypotheses that individuals more frequently exposed to negative coverage 
express corresponding increasing levels of intolerance.  My experiments also revealed that 
more frequent exposure to positive news stories yields increases in tolerance. Exposure to 
one news story creates a substantial increase in tolerance while exposure to two positive 
stories creates a subsequent, but smaller increase.  
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In chapter 5, I moved on to demonstrate the relationships between intergroup 
contract, media, and tolerance. Overall, I find strong support for my hypothesis that 
contact (both self-reported and assigned in a laboratory setting) with a member of an 
outgroup increases tolerant attitudes towards the outgroup. However, I found mixed 
support for my expectations related to interactions between media and contact. OLS 
models using self-reported measures of contact in experiment II largely supported my 
hypotheses and examination of marginal effects revealed a complex interplay between 
contact, the type of media (negative or positive) and frequency of exposure.  Experiment 
III revealed that the positive effects of contact may be washed out by exposure to two 
negative articles or enhanced by exposure to a single positive one.  The results from 
chapters 4 and 5 lead me to the conclusion that factors influencing tolerance operate on a 
continuum. These factors (e.g. type of exposure, amount of exposure, and contact) 
interact with each other to create an overall effect on tolerance.  
My research demonstrates a complex interplay between the type (positive vs. 
negative), and the amount (frequency) of media, and contact on formation of tolerant 
judgments. It is imperative for future scholarly work to consider this complex interplay. 
Additional work will be needed to fully map the effects of both frequency and contact. 
Specifically, in my work I compared the effect of single vs. double news exposure, but a 
question remains as to how far the frequency effect extends. For example, what is the 
effect of 3 vs 2 news stories for both negative and positive exposure and when does the 
effect plateau? Additionally, my novel contact experiment design may be further 
developed to provide even more meaningful contact. This will be particularly instructive 
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in increasing our understanding of the interactions between contact and media. Finally, it 
will be important to generalize these effects beyond Muslim Americans by studying other 
groups.  
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Appendix: A 
Negative News Story: (Used in Experiment I, II, and III) 
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Positive News Story: (Used in Experiments I, II, and III) 
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Warm Up News Story: (Used in Experiment I) 
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Warm Up News Story: (Used in Experiment I)
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Control News Story: (Used in Experiment I) 
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Second Positive News Story: (Used in Experiment II) 
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Second Negative News Story: (Used in Experiment II, and III) 
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Control News Story: (Used in Experiment II and III) 
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Appendix B: 
Experiment II contact questions: 
 
How many ________ do you know? 
1. None  
2. 1  
3. 2  
4. 3-5  
5. More than 10 
 
How frequently do you have contact with a __________? 
1. Never 
2. Very Rarely 
3. Rarely 
4. Occasionally 
5. Frequently 
6. Very Frequently 
When you meet _______ individuals, in general do you find contact pleasant? 
1. Not at all 
2. Slightly 
3. Moderately 
4. Very 
5. Extremely 
When you meet Muslims, in general do you find contact superficial? 
1. Extremely  
2. Very 
3. Moderately 
4. Slightly 
5. Not at all 
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Figure 5.2:  Experiment III.  Support for Muslim public rallies is significantly 
increased (p<0.1, one-tailed) in the two negative article plus contact 
treatment as compared to both control and two negative article treatments. 
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